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Expropriation

The rules of international law governing the expropriation of alien property have long been of central concern to foreigners in general and to foreign investors in particular. Expropriation is the most severe form of interference with property. All expectations of the investor are destroyed if the investment is taken without adequate compensation.

On the level of customary international law, the minimum standard for the protection of aliens came to place limitations on the territorial sovereignty of the host state and to protect alien property. On the level of treaty law, all modern agreements on foreign investment contain specific provisions covering preconditions for and consequences of expropriation.

1. The right to expropriate

Consistent with the notion of territorial sovereignty, the classical rules of international law have accepted the host state’s right to expropriate alien property in principle. Indeed, state practice has considered this right to be so fundamental that even modern investment treaties (often entitled agreements ‘for the promotion and protection of foreign investment’) respect this position. Treaty law typically addresses only the conditions and consequences of an expropriation, leaving the right to expropriate as such unaffected.

Even clauses in agreements between the host state and the investor that freeze the applicable law for the period of the agreement (‘stabilization clauses’) will not necessarily stand in the way of a lawful expropriation. The position is less clear if such an agreement explicitly excludes the right to expropriate. Except in extreme circumstances, an international tribunal will probably interpret such a clause in a literal manner. In practice, however, such far-reaching provisions have played no significant role.

2. The three branches of the law

Beyond the right of the host state to expropriate, international law on expropriation has developed three branches, which regulate the scope and conditions of the exercise of this power. The first one defines the interests that will be protected. This facet has not traditionally been in the forefront of academic and practical discussions but has received some prominence more recently. Most contemporary treaties, in their provisions dealing with expropriation, refer to ‘investments’. Similarly, the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals is typically restricted to disputes arising from ‘investments’. Therefore, it is ‘investments’ as defined in these treaties that are protected.

The second branch concerns the definition of an expropriation. While this matter raises no questions in cases of a formal expropriation, the issue may acquire a high degree of complexity when the host state interferes with the rights of the foreign owner without a formal taking of title. Indeed, in the practice of the past three decades, most cases relating to expropriation have turned on the controversy of whether or not a ‘taking’ had actually occurred. Matters of public health, the environment, or general changes in the regulatory system may prompt a state to regulate foreign investments. This has led to claims against the state on the basis that a regulatory taking or indirect expropriation has occurred. The elements of indirect expropriation are discussed below.

The third branch of the law on expropriation relates to the conditions under which a state may expropriate alien property. The classical requirements for lawful expropriation are a public purpose, non-discrimination, as well as prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. In practice, the requirement of compensation has turned out to be the most controversial aspect. This issue is discussed in the next section.

3. The legality of the expropriation

It is today generally accepted that the legality of a measure of expropriation is conditioned on three (or four) requirements. These requirements are contained in most treaties. They are also seen to be part of customary international law. These requirements must be fulfilled cumulatively:

- The measure must serve a public purpose. Given the broad meaning of ‘public purpose’, it is not surprising that this requirement has rarely been questioned by the foreign investor. However, tribunals did address the significance of the term and its limits in some cases.

1 Some states (e.g. Ecuador, Peru) have in the past provided in their constitutions that their contractual agreements with foreign investors may not be changed by a unilateral act. But they have not gone as far as excluding the right to expropriate. Article 249 of the Constitution of Ecuador (1998) provided for all contracts relating to public services: ‘The agreed contractual conditions cannot be modified unilaterally by law or other means.’ Article 62 of the 1993 Peruvian Constitution states: ‘Through contract-laws, the State can establish guarantees and grant assurances. They may not be amended legislatively.’

2 See pp 82 et seq.

3 For the concept of an investment, see pp 60 et seq. See further p 248.
4 See pp 101 et seq.
5 See eg ADC v Hungary, Award, 2 October 2006, paras 429–33.
The measure must not be arbitrary and discriminatory within the generally accepted meaning of the terms.

Some treaties explicitly require that the procedure of expropriation must follow principles of due process. Due process is an expression of the minimum standard under customary international law and of the requirement of fair and equitable treatment. Therefore, it is not clear whether such a clause, in the context of the rule on expropriation, adds an independent requirement for the legality of the expropriation.

The expropriatory measure must be accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. Adequate compensation is generally understood today to be equivalent to the market value of the expropriated investment.

Of these requirements for the legality of an expropriation, the measure of compensation has been by far the most controversial. In the period between roughly 1960 and 1990, the rules of customary law on compensation were at the centre of the debate on expropriation. They were discussed in the broader context of economic decolonization, the notion of 'Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources', and of the call for a new international economic order. Today, these fierce debates are over and nearly all expropriation cases before tribunals follow the treaty-based standard of compensation in accordance with the fair market value. In the terminology of the earlier decades this means 'full' or 'adequate' compensation. However, this does not mean that the amount of compensation is easy to determine. Especially in cases of foreign enterprises operating on the basis of complex contractual agreements, the task of valuation requires close cooperation of valuation experts and the legal profession.

Various methods may be employed to determine market value. The discounted cash flow method will often be a relevant yardstick, rather than book value or replacement value, in the case of a going concern that has already produced income. Before the point of reaching profitability, the liquidation value will be the more appropriate measure.

A traditional issue that has never been entirely resolved concerns the consequences of an illegal expropriation. In the case of an indirect expropriation, illegality will be the rule, since there will be no compensation.

According to one school of thought, the measure of damages for an illegal expropriation is no different from compensation for a lawful taking. The better view is that an illegal expropriation will fall under the general rules of state responsibility, while this is not so in the case of a lawful expropriation accompanied by compensation. In the case of an illegal act the damages should, as far as possible, restore the situation that would have existed had the illegal act not been committed. By contrast, compensation for a lawful expropriation should represent the market value at the time of the taking. The result of these two methods can be markedly different. The difference will mainly concern the amount of lost profits. The issue of compensation and damages is discussed in more detail in Chapter X on the settlement of investment disputes.

The requirement of 'prompt' compensation means 'without undue delay'. The requirement of 'effective' compensation means that payment is to be made in a convertible currency.

4. Direct and indirect expropriation

The difference between a direct or formal expropriation and an indirect expropriation turns on whether the legal title of the owner is affected by the measure in question. Today direct expropriations have become rare. States are reluctant to jeopardize their investment climate by taking the drastic and conspicuous step of an open taking of foreign property. An official act that takes the title of the foreign investor’s property will attract negative publicity and is likely to do lasting damage to the state’s reputation as a venue for foreign investments.

As a consequence, indirect expropriations have gained in importance. An indirect expropriation leaves the investor’s title untouched but deprives him of the possibility of utilizing the investment in a meaningful way. A typical feature of an indirect expropriation is that the state will deny the existence of an expropriation and will not contemplate the payment of compensation.

(a) Broad formulae: their substance and evolution

The contours of the definition of an indirect expropriation are not precisely drawn. An increasing number of arbitral cases and a growing body of literature on the subject have shed some light on the issue but the debate goes on. In some recent decisions by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), tribunals have interpreted the concept of indirect expropriation narrowly and have preferred to find a violation of the standard of fair and equitable treatment.

The concept of indirect expropriation as such was clearly recognized in the early case law of arbitral tribunals and of the Permanent Court of International Justice

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8 See eg D W Bowett, 'State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation for Termination or Breach' (1988) 59 BYIL 47; Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, 1928, PCIJ, Series A, No 17, 47. For a full discussion, see I Marbee, 'Compensation and Damages in International Law, The Limits of "Fair Market Value"' (2006) 7 J World Investment & Trade 723.
9 See pp 294–7.
11 Dolzer and Stevens, n 11.
12 But see Funnekotter v Zimbabwe, Award, 22 April 2009.
14 See pp 117 et seq.
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Bilateral and multilateral treaties and draft treaties typically contain a reference to indirect expropriation or to measures tantamount to expropriation. The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investment Abroad (1959) referred to 'measures against nationals of another Party to deprive them directly or indirectly of their property'. Essentially, the same wording appears in the 1967 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. The Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations referred to '[a]ny such taking of property whether direct or indirect'. The 1992 World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment speaks of expropriation or 'measures which have similar effects'. Similarly, the 1998 OECD Draft for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment refers to 'measures having equivalent effect'. Another variation is contained in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1992, which speaks of 'a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation'. The 1994 Energy Charter Treaty similarly refers to 'a measure or measures having equivalent effect to nationalization or expropriation'.

Most current bilateral investment treaties contain similar language. The current French Model Treaty states: 'Neither Contracting Party shall take any measures of expropriation or nationalization or any other measures having the effect of dispossession, direct or indirect, of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party of their investments.' According to the German Model Treaty '[i]nvestments by investors of either Contracting State shall not directly or indirectly be expropriated, nationalized or subjected to any other measure the effects of which would be tantamount to expropriation or nationalization.' The Model Treaty used by the United Kingdom provides that '[i]nvestments of nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation.'

The 2004 and 2012 US Model BITs approach the issue in greater detail. After stating in Article 6(1) that '[n]either Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization', a special Annex B entitled 'Expropriation' adds:

(a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case by case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: (i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action.

(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.

Among the broader formulae proposed in general studies and drafts, some have received special attention in the decisions of arbitral tribunals and in academic writings. Harvard Professors Sohn and Baxter included in their 1961 Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, a version that is elaborate and contains specific categories of indirect takings:

A taking of property includes not only an outright taking of property but also any such unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment, or disposal of property as to justify an inference that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy, or dispose of the property within a reasonable period of time after the inception of such interference.

The 1986 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (§ 712) is much shorter and in its text only speaks of a 'taking'. Comment (g) refers to actions 'that have the effect of "taking" the property, in whole or in large part, outright or in stages ("creeping expropriation")'.

A United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) study, prepared in 2000, uses different language and considers that 'measures short of physical takings may amount to takings in that they result in the effective loss of management, use or control, or a significant depreciation of the value, of the assets of a foreign investor'.

In an early influential article Gordon Christie reviewed the then existing case law and pointed to certain recognized groups and categories of indirect takings, without an attempt to present a general formula. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, in her 1982 Hague Lectures, questioned the usefulness of a distinction between non-compensable bona fide governmental regulation and 'taking' for a public purpose:

Is this distinction intellectually viable? Is not the State in both cases (that is, either by a taking for a public purpose, or by regulating) purporting to act in the common good? And in each case has the owner of the property not suffered loss? Under international law standards,

15 See Norwegian Shipowners' Claims, 1 RIAA 307 (1922); Case Concerning Cert in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926, PCIJ, Series A, No 7, 3.
16 French Model Treaty, Art 6(2).
17 German Model Treaty, Art 4(2).
18 UK Model Treaty, Art 5(1).
19 See US Model BITs, Art 6(1).
21 L B Sohn and R K Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens (1961) 55 AJIL 545, 553 (Art 10(3)(a)).
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a regulation that amounted (by virtue of its scope and effect) to a taking, would need to be "for a public purpose" (in the sense of a general, rather than for a private interest). And just compensation would be due.24

It has been argued elsewhere that the international law of expropriation has essentially grown out of, and mirrored, parallel domestic laws.25 As a consequence of this linkage, it appears plausible that measures that are, under the rules of key domestic laws, normally considered regulatory without requiring compensation, will not require compensation under international law either.

The importance of the effect of a measure for the question of whether an expropriation has occurred was highlighted by Reisman and Sloane:

tribunals have increasingly accepted that expropriation must be analyzed in consequential rather than in formal terms. What matters is the effect of governmental conduct—whether misfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance, or some combination of the three—on foreign property rights or control over an investment, nor whether the state promulgates a formal decree or otherwise expressly proclaims its intent to expropriate. For purposes of state responsibility and the obligation to make adequate reparation, international law does not distinguish indirect from direct expropriations.26 [Footnotes omitted]

In recent jurisprudence, the formula most often found is that an expropriation will be assumed in the event of a 'substantial deprivation' of an investment.27

The oscillating understanding of this approach may be illustrated in light of relevant jurisprudence.

(b) Judicial and arbitral practice: some illustrative cases

Cases decided by tribunals demonstrate the variety of scenarios in which the question of indirect expropriation may arise. Tribunals have had to adapt their focus of inquiry to these different circumstances; consequently, an emphasis on different aspects of the law should not necessarily be construed as an expression of inconsistency. Often, the facts of a case simply highlight only one specific factor and neglect of other possible factors does not result from oversight but from irrelevance to the specific circumstances. A short survey of cases may serve to demonstrate the diversity of factual bases and of the reasoning of tribunals.

The Oscar Chinn case28 concerned the interests of a British shipping company in the Congo. In the aftermath of the economic crisis of 1929, the Belgian Government intervened in the shipping trade on the Congo River by reducing the prices charged by Mr Chinn's only competitor, the partly state-owned company UNATRA. The government had also granted corresponding subsidies to UNATRA in order to keep the transport system on the Congo River viable. This made Oscar Chinn's business economically unsustainable. The PCIJ concluded that there was no taking. It said:

The Court... is unable to see in his [Mr Chinn's] original position... which was characterized by the possession of customers and the possibility of making a profit... anything in the nature of a genuine vested right. Favourable business conditions and good-will are transient circumstances, subject to inevitable changes... No enterprise... can escape from the chances and hazards resulting from general economic conditions.29

The arbitration in Revere Copper v OPIC,30 concerned a dispute arising from the insurance by the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)31 of an investment made by the US claimant in Jamaica. Revere Copper had made substantial investments in the Jamaican bauxite mining sector. An agreement concluded in 1967 between RJA, the investor's local subsidiary, and the Jamaican Government fixed the taxes and royalties to be paid by RJA for a period of 25 years and provided that no further taxes or financial burdens would be imposed on RJA by the Jamaican authorities. However, in 1972, the newly elected Jamaican Government announced far-reaching reform of the bauxite sector and, in 1974, increased the revenues to be paid by RJA so drastically that RJA ceased operating in 1975.

Revere Copper then sought recovery under its OPIC insurance contract, alleging that the measures adopted by the Jamaican Government amounted to an expropriation of Revere's investment. The General Terms and Conditions of the OPIC contract defined 'expropriatory action', inter alia, as: 'any action which... for a period of one year directly results in preventing... the Foreign Enterprise from exercising effective control over the use or disposition of substantial portion of its property or from constructing the project or operating the same.' Although there had been no direct interference with Revere's physical property, the majority of the Tribunal found that the repudiation of the guarantees given to Revere amounted to an action that had resulted in preventing the foreign enterprise from exercising effective control over the use or disposition of a substantial portion of its property:

OPIC argues that RJA still has all the rights and property that it had before the events of 1974: it is in possession of the plant and other facilities; it has its Mining Lease; it can operate as it did before. This may be true in a formal sense but... we do not regard RJA's 'control' of the use and operation of its properties as any longer 'effective' in view of the destruction by Government actions of its contract rights.32

The Arbitral Tribunal came to this conclusion by emphasizing that 'control in a large industrial enterprise... is exercised by a continuous stream of decisions'.33 and

24 R Higgins, 'The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law' (1982–III) 176 Recueil des Cours 259, 351.
27 See eg Société Générale v Dominican Republic, Award, 19 September 2008, para 64; Alpha Prototecholding v Ukraine, Award, 8 November 2010, para 408.
28 Oscar Chinn C v UK v Belgium), 12 December 1934, PCIJ, Series A/B, No 63, 4.
29 At 27.
30 Revere Copper v OPIC, Award, 24 August 1978.
31 On investment insurance and OPIC, see pp 228 et seq.
32 Revere Copper v OPIC, 291–2.
33 At 292.
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and purpose of a measure, in reference to the role of the intent of a government, consideration of the issue of legitimate expectations of the investor, control over the investment, the need for regulatory measures, and the duration of a measure. These issues are discussed explicitly in some decisions, although they are not necessarily the key to a fully homogeneous theory that does justice to all existing arbitral decisions. But they will assist in a better understanding of individual decisions and general trends.

Not surprisingly, significant lacunae and open issues remain in the law governing indirect expropriation. Domestic courts have grappled with the same issues for far longer. Despite the benefit of constitutional texts and the homogeneity of their national legal systems, they have been unable to resolve all problems. Sometimes these courts have stated that broad formulae will not be helpful as guidelines for judicial reasoning.79

(c) Effect or intention?

The effect of the measure upon the economic benefit and value as well as upon the control over the investment is the key question when deciding whether an indirect expropriation has taken place. Whenever this effect is substantial and lasts for a significant period of time, it will be assumed prima facie that at the property has occurred.80

Tribunals have accordingly based their decisions on economic considerations. Indirect expropriation was seen to exist if the measure constituted a deprivation of the economic use and enjoyment, 'as if the rights related thereto—such as the income or benefits...had ceased to exist',81 or when 'the use or enjoyment of benefits related thereto is excised or interfered with to a similar extent'.82 Other formulae and phrases have also been used.83

In RFCC v Morocco,84 the Tribunal stated that an indirect expropriation exists in cases where the measures have 'substantial effects of an intensity that reduces and/or removes the legitimate benefits related with the use of the rights targeted by the measure to an extent that they render their further possession useless'.85

Other decisions in various wording and degrees also emphasized the effect of the measure.86 The Tribunal in CMS v Argentina87 found that no indirect expropriation had occurred when Argentina unilaterally suspended a previously agreed tariff adjustment scheme for the gas transport sector in the context of its economic and financial crisis. The US company CMS had argued, inter alia, that the suspension of the tariff adjustment formula amounted to an indirect expropriation of its investment in the Argentine gas transport sector. The Tribunal rejected this argument even though it admitted that the measures had an important effect on the claimant's business:

The essential question is therefore to establish whether the enjoyment of the property has been effectively neutralized. The standard that a number of tribunals have applied in recent cases where indirect expropriation has been contended is that of substantial deprivation., . . . the investor is in control of the investment; the Government does not manage the day-to-day operations of the company; and the investor has full ownership and control of the investment.88

In Telenor v Hungary,89 the investor held a telecom concession which was affected by a special levy on all telecommunications service providers. The Tribunal held that in order to constitute an expropriation, the conduct complained of must have a major adverse impact on the economic value of the investment.90 The Tribunal said:

the interference with the investor's rights must be such as substantially to deprive the investor of the economic value, use or enjoyment of its investment.91 . . . In considering whether measures taken by government constitute expropriation the determinative factors are the intensity and duration of the economic deprivation suffered by the investor as the result of them.92

interference that makes any form of exploitation of the property disappear...; (9) an interference such that the property can no longer be put to reasonable use.

9 See eg Andrea v Allard, 444 US 51, 65; 100 S Ct 318 (1979):
There is no abstract or fixed point at which judicial intervention under the Takings Clause becomes appropriate. Formulas and factors have been developed in a variety of settings. See Penn Central, above, at 123-8.
Resolution of each case, however, ultimately calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic.

9 See eg Norwegian SP oilworkers' Claims, 1 RIAA 307 (1922); Goetz v Burnardi, Award, 10 February 1999; Middle East Cement v Egypt, Award, 12 April 2002; Metaludel Corp v Mexico, Award, 30 August 2000; CMS v Czech Republic, Partial Award, 13 September 2001.

10 Tecmed v Mexico, Award, 29 May 2003, para 115.
11 At para 116.
12 At paras 62, 263. See also Bruce Copper v Opp, 561 IR (1980) 258 and the cases discussed by G H Aldrich, 'What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran--
assured, thereby safeguarding the very object and purpose of the protection sought by the treaty.

The Tribunal in *Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine* explained that:

one can reasonably infer that a diminution of 5% of the investment's value will not be enough for a finding of expropriation, while a diminution of 95% would likely be sufficient.

Azurix v Argentina concerned breaches of a water concession by a province of Argentina. The Tribunal, although finding other breaches of the BIT, including fair and equitable treatment, denied the existence of an indirect expropriation, since the investor had retained control over the enterprise:

the impact on the investment attributable to the Province's actions was not to the extent required to find that, in the aggregate, these actions amounted to an expropriation; Azurix did not lose the attributes of ownership, at all times continued to control ABA and its ownership of 90% of the shares was unaffected. No doubt the management of ABA was affected by the Province's actions, but not sufficiently for the Tribunal to find that Azurix's investment was expropriated.

Similarly, in *LG&E v Argentina* the host state had violated the terms of concessions for the distribution of gas. The Tribunal, although finding that other standards had been violated, denied the existence of an expropriation in view of the investor's continuing control:

Ownership or enjoyment can be said to be 'neutralized' where a party no longer is in control of the investment, or where it cannot direct the day-to-day operations of the investment. Interference with the investment's ability to carry on its business is not satisfied where the investment continues to operate, even if profits are diminished.

Control is obviously an important aspect in the analysis of a taking. However, the continued exercise of control by the investor in itself is not necessarily the sole criterion. The issue becomes obvious when a host state substantially deprives the investor of the value of the investment leaving the investor with control of an entity that amounts to not much more than a shell of the former investment.

This illustrates the significance of a test which includes criteria other than control, such as economic use and benefit. Any attempt to define an indirect expropriation on the basis of one factor alone will not lead to a satisfactory result in all cases. In particular, an approach that looks exclusively at control over the overall investment is unable to contemplate the expropriation of specific rights enjoyed by the investor.

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127 *Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine*, Award, 26 July 2007, para 120.
128 *Azurix v Argentina*, Award, 14 July 2006.
129 At para 322.
130 *LG&E v Argentina*, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006.
131 At paras 188, 191. Footnotes omitted.
132 Waste Management v Mexico, Award, 30 April 2004, paras 141, 147; *EnCana v Ecuador*, Award, 3 February 2006, paras 172–83. For an extensive discussion, see U Kriebaum, 'Partial Expropriation' (2007) 8 *World Investment & Trade* 69.
133 *Middle East Cement v Egypt*, Award, 12 April 2002.
134 At paras 101, 105, 107, 127.
135 At paras 138, 144.
136 At paras 152–6, 163–5.
137 *Eureko v Poland*, Partial Award, 19 August 2005.
138 At paras 239–41.
140 *Grand River v United States*, Award, 12 January 2011, para 146.
141 At paras 148 et seq.
(h) Duration of a measure

The duration of a governmental measure affecting the interests of a foreign investor is important for the assessment of whether an expropriation has occurred. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal has ruled that the appointment of a temporary manager by the host state against the will of the foreign investor will constitute a taking if the consequential deprivation is not 'merely ephemeral'.

Investment tribunals have also laid emphasis on the duration of the measure in question. In SD Myers v Canada, the Tribunal said:

An expropriation usually amount to a lasting removal of the ability of an owner to make use of its economic rights although it may be that, in some contexts and circumstances, it would be appropriate to view a deprivation as amounting to an expropriation, even if it were partial or temporary.

In the event, the Tribunal found that the measure had lasted for 18 months only and that this limited effect did not amount to an expropriation.

In Wena Hotels v Egypt, the Tribunal found that the seizure of the investor's hotel lasting for nearly a year was not 'ephemeral' but amounted to an expropriation. In its subsequent Decision on Interpretation the Tribunal said:

It is true that the Original Tribunal did not explicitly state that such expropriation totally and permanently deprived Wena of its fundamental rights of ownership. However, in assessing the weight of the actions described above, there was no doubt in the Tribunal's mind that the deprivation of Wena's fundamental rights of ownership was so profound that the expropriation was indeed a total and permanent one.

LG&E v Argentina also ruled that the duration of the measure had to be taken into account. The Tribunal found that, as a rule, only an interference that is permanent will lead to an expropriation:

Similarly, one must consider the duration of the measure as it relates to the degree of interference with the investor's ownership rights. Generally, the expropriation must be permanent, that is to say, it cannot have a temporary nature, unless the investment's successful development depends on the realization of certain activities at specific moments that may not endure variations.

The Tribunal concluded:

Thus, the effect of the Argentine State's actions has not been permanent on the value of the Claimants' shares, and Claimants' investment has not ceased to exist. Without a permanent, severe deprivation of LG&E's rights with regard to its investment, or almost complete deprivation of the value of LG&E's investment, the Tribunal concludes that these circumstances do not constitute expropriation.

(i) Creeping expropriation

The rules on protection of foreign investments must not be circumvented by way of splitting a measure amounting to an indirect expropriation into a series of cumulative steps which, taken together, have the same effect on the foreign owner. Therefore, it has long been accepted that an expropriation may occur 'outright or in stages'. Thus, the term 'creeping expropriation' describes a taking through a series of acts. A study by UNCTAD referred to a slow and incremental encroachment on one or more of the ownership rights of a foreign investor that diminishes the value of its investment.

Practice has recognized the phenomenon of creeping expropriation on a number of occasions. The Tribunal in Generation Ukraine v Ukraine explained creeping expropriation as follows:

Creeping expropriation is a form of indirect expropriation with a distinctive temporal quality in the sense that it encapsulates the situation whereby a series of acts attributable to the State over a period of time culminate in the expropriatory taking of such property. A plea of creeping expropriation must proceed on the basis that the investment existed at a particular point in time and that subsequent acts attributable to the State have eroded the investor's rights to its investment to an extent that is violative of the relevant international standard of protection against expropriation.
The decision in *Tradex v Albania*\(^{192}\) emphasized the cumulative effect of the measures in question:

While the... Award has come to the conclusion that none of the single decisions and events alleged by Tradex to constitute an expropriation can indeed be qualified by the Tribunal as expropriation, it might still be possible that, and the Tribunal, therefore, has to examine and evaluate hereafter whether the combination of the decisions and events can be qualified as expropriation of Tradex' foreign investment in a long, step-by-step process by Albania.\(^{193}\)

In *Siemens v Argentina*,\(^{194}\) the host state had taken a series of adverse measures, including postponements and suspensions of the investor's profitable activities, fruitless renegotiations, and ultimately cancellation of the project. The Tribunal found that this had amounted to an expropriation and described creeping expropriation in the following terms:

By definition, creeping expropriation refers to a process, to steps that eventually have the effect of an expropriation. If the process stops before it reaches that point, then expropriation would not occur. This does not necessarily mean that no adverse effects would have occurred. Obviously, each step must have an adverse effect but by itself may not be significant or considered an illegal act. The last step in a creeping expropriation that tilts the balance is similar to the straw that breaks the camel's back. The preceding straws may not have had a perceptible effect but are part of the process that led to the break.\(^{195}\)

Professor Reisman and R D Sloane have rightly pointed out that the issue must sometimes be seen in retrospect:

Discrete acts, analyzed in isolation rather than in the context of the overall flow of events, may, whether legal or not in themselves, seem innocuous vis-a-vis a potential expropriation. Some may not be expropriatory in themselves. Only, in retrospect will it become evident that those acts comprised part of an accretion of deleterious acts and omissions, which in the aggregate expropriated the foreign investor's property rights... Because of their gradual and cumulative nature, creeping expropriations also render it problematic, perhaps even arbitrary, to identify a single interference (or failure to act where a duty requires it) as the 'moment of expropriation'.\(^{196}\)

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5. Expropriation of contractual rights

'The taking away or destruction of rights acquired, transmitted, and defined by a contract is as much a wrong, entitling the sufferer to redress, as the taking away or destruction of tangible property.' This principle, stated in 1903 by a member of the US-Venezuela Mixed Claims Commission in the *Rudloff* case,\(^{197}\) was followed in 1922 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the *Norwegian Shipowners' Claim* case,\(^{198}\) and also by the PCIJ in 1926 in the *Chorzow Factory* case.\(^{199}\) Cases decided in investment arbitrations\(^{200}\) and by the Iran–US Claims Tribunal\(^{201}\) have confirmed this position.

In *Amoco International Finance Corp v Iran* the Iran–US Claims Tribunal held that expropriation may extend to any right that can be the object of a commercial transaction.\(^{202}\) The Arbitral Tribunal in *Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine* stated that all business operations associated with the physical property of the investors are covered by the term 'investment', including contractual rights.\(^{203}\)

In the modern investment context, many investment decisions are accompanied and protected by specific investment agreements with the host state, often covering matters such as taxation, customs regulations, the right and duty to sell at a certain price to the host state, or pricing issues. These agreements form the legal and financial foundations of the investment, and the business decisions based upon them may collapse in their absence. Thus, it is understandable that practically all investment treaties state that contracts are covered by the term 'investment'.\(^{204}\) In turn, provisions dealing with expropriation in these treaties refer to 'investments'. It follows that contracts are protected against expropriation. The Tribunal in *Siemens v Argentina*,\(^{205}\) applying the BIT between Argentina and Germany, said:

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\(^{192}\) *Tradex v Albania*, Award, 29 April 1999.

\(^{193}\) At para 191.

\(^{194}\) *Siemens v Argentina*, Award, 6 February 2007.

\(^{195}\) At para 263.


\(^{198}\) Permanent Court of Arbitration, *Norwegian Shipowners' Claim* (Norway v United States), 13 October 1922, I RIAA 307 (1948). The arbitrators held that by requisitioning ships that were to be built for Norwegian citizens, the US Government also expropriated the underlying construction contracts.

\(^{199}\) See in particular *Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia*, 1926, PCIJ, Series A, No 7, 3.

\(^{200}\) See *SNP v Egypt*, Award, 20 May 1992, paras 164–7; *Wena Hotels v Egypt*, Award, 8 December 2000, para 98; *CME v Czech Republic*, Partial Award, 13 September 2001, para 591; *Imiprolgof v Pakistan*, Decision on Jurisdiction, 22 April 2005, para 274; *Eurko v Poland*, Partial Award, 19 August 2005, para 241; *Bayindir v Pakistan*, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005, para 255; *Aurix v Argentina*, Award, 14 July 2006, para 314; *Inmarit v Ukraine*, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 March 2010, para 66; contracts may lead to 'a claim of money' even if the agreement is fictitious.

\(^{201}\) Article IV-2 of the Treaty of Amity between Iran and the USA (1955) protects not only 'property' but also 'interests in property'. According to the tribunal in *Phillips Petroleum Company v Iran*, the term 'interest in property' was 'included at the insistence of the United States for the stated purpose of ensuring that contract rights in the petroleum industry would be protected by the treaty in the same way as would the older type of property represented by a petroleum concession' (see *Phillips Petroleum Company v Iran*, Award, 29 June 1985, para 105).

\(^{202}\) *Amoco International Finance Corp v Iran*, Award, 14 July 1987, para 108.

\(^{203}\) *Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine*, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004, paras 92–3.


\(^{205}\) *Siemens v Argentina*, Award, 6 February 2007.
Expropriation

The Contract falls under the definition of 'investments' under the Treaty and Article 4(2) refers to expropriation or nationalization of investments. Therefore, the State parties recognized that an investment in terms of the Treaty may be expropriated. There is nothing unusual in this regard. There is a long judicial practice that recognizes that expropriation is not limited to tangible property.206

Not every failure by a government to perform a contract amounts to an expropriation even if the violation leads to a loss of rights under the contract. A simple breach of contract at the hands of the state is not an expropriation.207 Tribunals have found that the determining factor is whether the state acted in an official, governmental capacity.208

In the Jalapa Railroad case before the American Mexican Claims Commission (1948),209 the decisive issue was whether the nullification of a contractual clause by the Mexican Government was 'effected arbitrarily by means of a governmental power illegal under international law'. In Consortium RFCC v Morocco, the Tribunal differentiated between the mere exercise of a right and an action by the host state 'in a public capacity' and placed emphasis on whether a law or a governmental decree had been passed or a judgment executed.210

Other tribunals have held similarly that mere breaches of contract or defects in its performance would not amount to an expropriation. What was needed was an act of public authority.211 In Siemens v Argentina,212 the Tribunal, in the course of its discussion of expropriation, found that a state party to a contract would breach the applicable treaty only if its behaviour went beyond that which an ordinary contracting party could adopt.213 The Tribunal said:

...for the State to incur international responsibility it must act as such, it must use its public authority. The actions of the State have to be based on its 'superior governmental power'. It is not a matter of being disappointed in the performance of the State in the execution of a contract but rather of interference in the contract execution through governmental action.214

In particular, tribunals have held that failure to pay a debt under a contract does not amount to an expropriation.215 Waste Management v Mexico216 concerned a concession for waste disposal. The Tribunal found that the mere non-payment by the city of Acapulco of amounts due under the concession agreement did not amount to an expropriation.217 It found that the state's failure to pay bills, did not amount to an 'outright repudiation of the transaction' and did not purport to terminate the contract. Only a decree or executive act or an exercise of legislative public authority could amount to an expropriation:

The mere non-performance of a contractual obligation is not to be equated with a taking of property, nor (unless accompanied by other elements) is it tantamount to expropriation. Any private party can fail to perform its contracts, whereas nationalization and expropriation are inherently governmental acts.218...

The Tribunal concludes that it is one thing to expropriate a right under a contract and another to fail to comply with the contract. Non-compliance by a government with contractual obligations is not the same thing as, or equivalent or tantamount to, an

Expropriation of contractual rights

While these considerations are clearly helpful, they do not exhaust the subject. Indeed, the Waste Management tribunal itself recognized, without elaboration, that 'one could envisage conduct tantamount to an expropriation which consisted of acts and omissions not specifically or exclusively governmental'.219 An analysis that is consistent with the approach generally valid for all acts of expropriation would not focus exclusively on the existence of formal governmental acts or the purported intentions of the government but would also contemplate other relevant factors.220

206 At para 267. The Tribunal relied on the Norwegian Shipowners and Chourage Factory cases.
208 See also the American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Vol 2 (1986), p 201; 'a state is responsible for such a repudiation or breach only ... if it is akin to an expropriation in that the contract is repudiated or breached for governmental rather than commercial reasons.'
210 RFCC v Morocco, Award, 22 December 2003, para 60; 2. 65-9, 85 9.
211 Impregilo v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 22 April 2005, para 281; Beyendor v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005, para 257; Acker v Argentina, Award, 14 July 2006, para 315.
212 Siemens v Argentina, Award, 6 February 2007.
213 At para 248.
214 At para 253.
from the terms of the applicable investment treaty and not from any set of expectations investors may have or claim to have.95

In *Salska v Czech Republic*,96 an ailing bank in which the claimants had invested was taken over by a competitor that had received financial assistance from the state for the purpose of the takeover. By contrast, the bank had not received similar aid when the claimants attempted to negotiate the conditions to maintain the viability of the bank. The Tribunal found that there was a violation of FET and described the requirements of the FET standard in terms of consistency, transparency, and reasonableness:

A foreign investor whose interests are protected under the Treaty is entitled to expect that the [host state] will not act in a way that is manifestly inconsistent, non-transparent, unreasonable (i.e. unrelated to some rational policy), or discriminatory (i.e. based on unjustifiable distinctions).97

The NAFTA case, *Waste Management v Mexico*,98 arose from a failed concession for the disposal of waste that involved a number of grievances, including the municipality's failure to pay its bills, failure to honour exclusivity of services, difficulties with a line of credit agreement, and proceedings before the Mexican courts. The Tribunal summarized its position on the FET standard in Article 1105 of the NAFTA in the following terms:

the minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment is infringed by conduct attributable to the State and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety—as might be the case with a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency and candour in an administrative process. In applying this standard it is relevant that the treatment is in breach of representations made by the host State which were reasonably relied on by the claimant.99

Discrimination against foreigners has been regarded as an important indicator of failure to grant fair and equitable treatment.100 Awards have also included the standard of 'improper and discreditable’101 or ‘unreasonable conduct’,102 or have referred to international or comparative standards.103

95 At para 67.
97 At para 309.
98 *Waste Management v Mexico*, Final Award, 30 April 2004.
99 At para 98. On the facts of the particular case, the Tribunal found that this standard had not been violated. At para 140.
103 *SD Myers v Canada*, First Partial Award, 1 November 2005, para 264.

### Specific applications of the fair and equitable treatment standard

Broad definitions or descriptions are not the only way to gauge the meaning of an elusive concept such as FET. Another method is to identify typical factual situations to which this principle has been applied.104 An examination of the practice of tribunals demonstrates that several principles can be identified which are embraced by the standard of fair and equitable treatment. The cases discussed below clearly speak to the central role of stability, transparency, and the investor’s legitimate expectations for the current understanding of the FET standard. Other contexts in which the standard has been applied concern compliance with contractual obligations, procedural propriety and due process, acting in good faith, and freedom from coercion and harassment.105

#### Stability and the protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations

The investor’s legitimate expectations are based on the host state’s legal framework and on any undertakings and representations made explicitly or implicitly by the host state.106 The legal framework on which the investor is entitled to rely consists of legislation and treaties, assurances contained in decrees, licences, and similar executive statements, as well as contractual undertakings. Specific representations play a central role in the creation of legitimate expectations. Undertakings and representations made explicitly or implicitly by the host state are the strongest basis for legitimate expectations. A reversal of assurances by the host state that have led to legitimate expectations will violate the principle of fair and equitable treatment.107

Tribunals have emphasized that the legitimate expectations of the investor will be grounded in the legal order of the host state as it stands at the time the investor acquires the investment.108 *GAMI v Mexico* ruled categorically: ‘NAFTA arbitrations have no mandate to evaluate laws and regulations that predate the decision of

105 For decisions adopting similar categories for the analysis of the FET standard, see: *Biwater Gauff v Tanzania*, Award, 24 July 2008, para 602; *Rumeli v Kazakhasthan*, Award, 29 July 2008, para 609; *Siag v Egypt*, Award, 1 June 2009, para 450; *Besyndur v Pakistan*, Award, 27 August 2009, para 178; *Lemire v Ukraine*, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 14 January 2010, para 284; *Pamuk v Mongolia*, Award, 28 April 2011, para 253.
state had consciously and overtly breached Eureko’s basic expectations. Therefore, the Tribunal had no hesitation in concluding that the FET standard of the Netherlands–Poland BIT had been violated by the respondent.

Other tribunals have similarly found that the FET principle involved the government’s obligation not to frustrate the investor’s legitimate expectations by arbitrarily changing the legal framework under which the investment had been made. According to one view, the investor’s legitimate expectations will be seriously reduced if there is general instability in the political conditions of the country concerned.

Legitimate expectations are not subjective hopes and perceptions; rather, they must be based on objectively verifiable facts. Expectations are protected only if they are legitimate and reasonable in the circumstances. The Tribunal in Suez v Argentina stated that:

one must not look single-mindedly at the Claimants’ subjective expectations. The Tribunal must rather examine them from an objective and reasonable point of view. (2010) 168-9.

More recently, tribunals have increasingly emphasized that the requirement of stability is not absolute and does not affect the state’s right to exercise its sovereign power to legislate and to adapt its legal system to changing circumstances. What matters is whether measures exceed normal regulatory powers and fundamentally modify the regulatory framework for the investment beyond an acceptable margin of change. In other words, ‘changes to general legislation, in the absence of specific stabilization promises to the foreign investor, reflect a legitimate exercise of the host state’s governmental powers that are not prevented by a BIT’s fair and equitable treatment standard’. The Tribunal in EDF v Romania stated in this respect:

126 At paras 231, 232.
127 At para 234.
128 CME v Czech Republic, Partial Award, 13 September 2001, para 611; Başindir v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005, para 231–2; LG&E v Argentina, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, para 131; PSEG v Turkey, Award, 19 January 2007, para 240–56; Enron v Argentina, Award, 22 May 2007, para 260–2; Sempra v Argentina, Award, 28 September 2007, para 300, 303; National Grid v Argentina, Award, 3 November 2008, para 178–9; Alpha v Ukraine, Award, 8 November 2010, para 426; Lemire v Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 14 January 2010, para 267; Award, 28 March 2011, para 68–73.
129 At para 209.
131 El Pao v Argentina, Award, 31 October 2011, para 402.
132 Total v Argentina, Decision on Liability, 27 December 2010, para 164. See also paras 113–24, 309, 312, 429.
133 EDF v Romania, Award, 8 October 2009.

The idea that legitimate expectations, and therefore FET, imply the stability of the legal and business framework, may not be correct if stated in an overly-broad and unqualified formulation. The FET might then mean the virtual freezing of the legal regulation of economic activities, in contrast with the State’s normal regulatory power and the evolutionary character of economic life. Except where specific promises or representations are made by the State to the investor, the latter may not rely on a bilateral investment treaty as a kind of insurance policy against the risk of any changes in the host State’s legal and economic framework. Such expectation would be neither legitimate nor reasonable.

In deciding between the investor’s right to stability and the state’s right to regulate, some tribunals have weighed the investor’s legitimate expectations against the state’s duty to act in the public interest.

Particularly important in the creation of legitimate expectations are specific assurances and representations made by the host state in order to induce investors to make investments. But even here some tribunals have found that mere political statements were not capable of creating reasonable expectations.

bb. Transparency

Transparency is closely related to protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations. Transparency means that the legal framework for the investor’s operations is readily apparent and that any decisions affecting the investor can be traced to that legal framework.

There is authority to the effect that transparency and the investor’s legitimate expectations are protected even without a treaty guarantee of FET. In SPP v Egypt the respondent contended that certain acts of Egyptian officials, upon which the claimants relied, were null and void because they were in conflict with the inalienable nature of the public domain and because they were not taken pursuant to the procedures prescribed by Egyptian law. The Tribunal rejected this argument and emphasized that the investor was entitled to rely on the official representations of the government:

126 At para 217.
127 Saluka v Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para 306; Total v Argentina, Decision on Liability, 27 December 2010, paras 123, 309. For an instance where a tribunal found minute of regulatory powers, see Vivendi v Argentina, Award, 20 August 2007, para 7.4.26.
129 Continental Casualty v Argentina, Award, 5 September 2008, para 261 (1); El Pao v Argentina, Award, 31 October 2011, para 375–9, 392–5.
At the same time, the standard would be eviscerated and downgraded to a meaningless requirement if it were assumed—as was the case in *LESI v Algeria*—that it accords no more protection than clauses on national treatment or most-favoured-nation treatment. Lack of resources to take appropriate action will not serve as an excuse for the host state. Whenever state organs themselves act in violation of the standard, or significantly contribute to such action, no issues of attribution or due diligence will arise because the state will then be held directly responsible. The standard will not be violated if a state exercises its right to legislate and regulate and thereby takes reasonable measures under the circumstances. Recognition of a state’s police power will not in itself lead to different conclusions; the existence of this power is consumed in the sovereign right to regulate, within the boundaries of international law, and does not in itself justify more far-reaching measures affecting the rights of the investor.

(c) Protection against physical violence and harassment

The duty to grant physical protection and security may operate in relation to encroachment by state organs or in relation to private acts. Violence by state organs was under review in *AACL v Sri Lanka*, a case in which security forces had destroyed the investment in the course of a counter-insurgency operation. The Tribunal reviewed all circumstances and held that these actions were unwarranted and excessive.

In *Wena Hotels v Egypt*, the Tribunal found Egypt liable under the standard because employees of a state entity had seized the hotel in question and because the police authorities had been aware of the seizure and had not acted to protect the investor before or after the invasive action.

In *AMT v Zaire*, the host country was held liable under a protection and security clause in the applicable BIT after incidents of looting by elements of the armed forces.

In *Eureko v Poland*, there was an allegation of harassment of the investor’s senior representatives. The Tribunal found that there was no violation of the standard since there was no evidence that the state had authorized or instigated these acts. However, the position might have been different had such actions occurred repeatedly without protective measures on the part of the state.

Other cases have concerned private violence. In the *ELSI* case, a Chamber of the ICJ applied a provision in an FCN treaty that granted ‘the most constant protection and security’. One charge by the claimants was that the Italian authorities had allowed workers to occupy the factory. The Court found that the response of the Italian authorities had been adequate under the circumstances. The Court stated that ‘The reference in Article V to the provision of “constant protection and security” cannot be construed as the giving of a warranty that property shall never in any circumstances be occupied or disturbed’.

In *Techmed v Mexico*, the claimant alleged that the Mexican authorities had not acted efficiently against ‘social demonstrations’ and disturbances at the site of the landfill under dispute. The Tribunal applied a treaty provision guaranteeing ‘full protection and security to the investments...in accordance with International Law’. It found that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that the Mexican authorities had encouraged, fostered, or contributed to the actions in question and that there was no evidence that the authorities had not reacted reasonably.

Similarly, *Noble Ventures v Romania* involved demonstrations and protests by employees. The relevant treaty provision stipulated that the ‘Investment shall...enjoy full protection and security’. The Tribunal rejected the claim, finding that it was difficult to identify any specific failure on the part of Romania to exercise due diligence in protecting the claimant.

(d) Legal protection

There is also authority to the effect that the principle of full protection and security reaches beyond physical violence and requires legal protection for the investor. Some treaties explicitly provide for ‘full protection and legal security’. However, case law supports the view that the usual formula of ‘full protection and security’ also provides protection against infringements of the investor’s rights. In the *ELSI* case, the guarantee of ‘the most constant protection and security’ was also the basis for a complaint concerning the time taken (16 months) for a decision on an appeal against an order requisitioning the factory. The ICJ’s

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53. *TECMED v Mexico*, Award, 25 May 2003, para 177; *Noble Ventures v Romania*, Award, 12 October 2005, para 164; *Saluka v Czech Republic*, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para 484; *Suez v Argentina*, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010, para 158.

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248. At para 105–8.

249. At para 108.


251. At para 175–7.


253. At paras 164–6.


255. See eg Art 4(1) of the Germany-Argentina BIT of 9 April 1991 (‘plena protección y seguridad jurídica’).

Chamber examined this argument and found that the time taken, though undoubtedly long, did not violate the treaty standard in view of other procedural safeguards under Italian law.265

In *CME v Czech Republic*,257 a regulatory authority had created a legal situation that enabled the investor’s local partner to terminate the contract on which the investment depended. The Tribunal said that ‘The host State is obligated to ensure that neither by amendment of its laws nor by actions of its administrative bodies is the agreed and approved security and protection of the foreign investor’s investment withdrawn or devalued’.258

The tribunal in *Lauder v Czech Republic*, however, denied a violation of the standard on the basis of the same facts. It reached the result that the only duty of the host state under the ‘protection and security’ clause had been to grant the investor access to its judicial system.259

In *Azurix v Argentina*,260 the Tribunal confirmed that ‘full protection and security’ may be breached even if no physical violence or damage occurs.261

The cases referred to above show that full protection and security was understood to go beyond protection and security ensured by the police. It is not only a matter of physical security: the stability afforded by a secure investment environment is as important from an investor’s point of view. The tribunal is aware that in recent free trade agreements signed by the United States, for instance, with Uruguay, full protection and security is understood to be limited to the level of police protection required under customary international law. However, when the terms ‘protection and security’ are qualified by ‘full’ and no other adjective or explanation, they extend, in their ordinary meaning, the content of this standard beyond physical security.262

In *Siemens v Argentina*,263 the Tribunal derived additional authority for the proposition that ‘full protection and security’ goes beyond physical security and extends to legal protection from the fact that the applicable BIT’s definition of investment also applied to intangible assets:

As a general matter and based on the definition of investment, which includes tangible and intangible assets, the Tribunal considers that the obligation to provide full protection and security is wider than ‘physical’ protection and security. It is difficult to understand how the physical security of an intangible asset would be achieved.264

In *Vivendi v Argentina*,265 the Tribunal had to apply a clause requiring ‘full protection and security in accordance with the principle of fair and equitable treatment’. The Tribunal found that the scope of such a provision is not limited to safeguarding ‘physical possession or the legally protected terms of the operation of the investment’.266

*Sempra v Argentina*,267 recognized that the standard has traditionally developed in the context of physical protection of the investment, but that exceptionally a broader interpretation would be possible.

The investor may also have to take active measures to protect the investment. In *GEA v Ukraine*,268 the claimant argued that the host state should have initiated proceedings to inquire into a theft of the claimant’s property. The Tribunal rejected the claim because the claimant itself had not brought a criminal complaint.

*Bitwater Gauff v Tanzania*,269 confirmed that the guarantee of ‘full security’ extends to actions both of the host state and of third parties.270 Due diligence is not observed in the case of failure ‘to take reasonable, precautionary and preventive action’ to protect an investment.271 Full protection implies ‘a State’s guarantee to stability in a secure environment, both physical, commercial and legal’.272

Some tribunals have denied the applicability of this standard to legal protection. According to *Suez v Argentina*,273 the concept of ‘full protection and security’ would not cover issues of legal security. The Tribunal assumed, as did *Romeli v Kazakhstan*,274 that the traditional interpretation given to this term stands in the way of an understanding that would extend to a broader construction; without further explanation, the *Suez* Tribunal also stated that this view is supported by a textual method of interpretation.275

In this context it is doubtful whether it is useful to distinguish ‘full protection and security’ from ‘protection and security’ and to assume that the absence of the word ‘full’ means that the standard must be given a narrower meaning which extends to physical security only.276

The Tribunal in *Parkering v Lithuania*,277 ruled that ‘full protection and security’ not only requires the prevention of damage, but also requires the host state ‘to restore the previous situation’ and ‘to punish the author of the injury’.

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256 At para 109.
258 At para 613.
260 *Azurix v Argentina*, Award, 14 July 2006.
261 At para 406.
262 At para 408.
263 *Siemens v Argentina*, Award, 6 February 2007.
264 At para 303.
265 *Vivendi v Argentina*, Award, 20 August 2007.
266 At para 7.4.15. Cited approvingly in *AES v Hungary*, Award, 23 September 2010, para 13.3.2.
267 *Sempra v Argentina*, Award, 28 September 2007, para 323.
268 *GEA v Ukraine*, Award, 31 March 2011, para 247.
269 *Bitwater Gauff v Tanzania*, Award, 24 July 2008.
270 At para 730.
271 At para 725.
272 At para 729.
275 At para 171.
276 See *Parkering v Lithuania*, Award, 11 September 2007, para 354. But see also the discussion in *Suez v Argentina*, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010, para 161 et seq. in particular para 169.
277 *Parkering v Lithuania*, Award, 11 September 2007, para 355.
The umbrella clause

3. The umbrella clause

(a) Meaning and origin

An umbrella clause is a provision in an investment protection treaty that guarantees the observance of obligations assumed by the host state vis-à-vis the investor. These clauses are referred to as 'umbrella clauses' because they bring contractual and other commitments under the treaty's protective umbrella. At times they are also referred to as 'observance of undertakings clauses'. The most contentious issue in relation to clauses of this kind is whether, and in what circumstances, they place contracts between the host state and the investor under the treaty's protection. A typical umbrella clause in a contemporary version is Article 2(2) of the British Model Treaty: 'Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party.'

The German Model Treaty contains a similar clause in Article 8(2). Many, but by no means all, BITs contain clauses of this type. The ECT offers such a clause in Article 10(1), but the NAFTA does not contain an umbrella clause.

The wording of umbrella clauses in investment treaties is not uniform. A general discussion must allow for the variation in language of these clauses and the resulting differences in interpretation. Some treaties follow the British model quoted above, whereas other treaties use more detailed wording. The investment protection treaty concluded between France and Hong Kong in 1995 states in Article III:

Without prejudice to the provisions of this Agreement, each Contracting Party shall observe any particular obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting Party, including provisions more favourable than those of this Agreement.

A provision that addresses the future legal order of the host state is not an umbrella clause properly speaking:

Each contracting Party shall create and maintain in its territory a legal framework apt to guarantee to investors the continuity of legal treatment, including the compliance, in good faith, of all undertakings assumed with regard to each specific investor.

Umbrella clauses are by no means of recent vintage. The BIT between Germany and Pakistan of 1959—the first modern investment treaty—already contained a clause of the same kind as the current German Model Treaty. In 1959, the German Government informed the German Parliament about the effect of an umbrella clause: 'The violation of such an obligation [of an investment agreement] accordingly will also amount to a violation of the international legal obligation contained in the present Treaty.'

The historical-legal context in which the origin of the clause must be assessed pertains to the post-1945 controversies about the status of investment agreements as contracts subject to the domestic laws of the host state or, alternatively, as undertakings on the level of international law. In 1929, the PCIJ ruled in the Serbian Loans case that '[a]ny contract which is not a contract between States in
their capacity as subjects of international law is based on the municipal law of some country.  

Contract claims may be put under the protection of a treaty and be referred to international adjudication. This point is made in Oppenheim’s *International Law* in the following words:

It is doubtful whether a breach by a state of its contractual obligations with aliens constitutes per se a breach of an international obligation, unless there is some such additional element as denial of justice, or expropriation, or breach of treaty, in which case it is that additional element which will constitute the basis for the state’s international responsibility. However, either by virtue of a term in the contract itself or of an agreement between the state and the alien, or by virtue of an agreement between the state allegedly in breach of its contractual obligations and the state of which the alien is a national, disputes as to compliance with the terms of contracts may be referred to an internationally composed tribunal, applying, at least in part, international law.

After 1945, projects for large-scale foreign investments prompted the question whether guarantees given under the domestic law of the host state provided sufficient legal stability to justify the required expenditures for such projects. Umbrella clauses were seen as a bridge between private contractual arrangements, the domestic law of the host state, and public international law allowing for more investor security. One effect of these clauses is to blur the distinction between investment arbitration and commercial arbitration.

An umbrella clause in a treaty protects a contract that an investor has entered into with the host state and is an expression of the maxim *statutum servandum*. It follows that in the presence of an umbrella clause a breach by the host country of an investment contract with the foreign investor constitutes a violation of the treaty and can be raised in international arbitration.

Until 2005, the umbrella clause received little attention in academic discussion or arbitral practice, although it was often reflected in treaties. Those few authors who drew attention to the clause essentially shared the German view of the purpose of the clause as a means to elevate violations of investment contracts to the level of international law. However, this phase of unanimity came to an end with the arbitral decision in *SGS v Pakistan* in 2003 which departed fundamentally from the conventional understanding of the clause. Ever since this ruling, the purpose, meaning, and scope of the clause have caused controversy and given rise to disturbingly divergent lines of jurisprudence.

(b) Effective application of umbrella clauses

One line of decisions gives full effect to umbrella clauses. This practice is best represented by *Noble Ventures v Romania* where the Tribunal had to interpret and apply the following clause in Article II(2)(c) of the BIT between the United States and Romania: ‘Each party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments.’ The US claimant in this case argued, inter alia, that Romania had breached the umbrella clause by failing to abide by its contractual obligation to renegotiate the debts of a formerly state-owned company acquired by the investor. The Tribunal insisted on the specificity of each umbrella clause, distinguishing earlier cases on this basis. The ruling emphasized that the wording obviously referred to investment contracts. Consistent with Article 31 of the VCLT, it emphasized the object and purpose of investment treaties.

In the view of the Tribunal:

two States may include in a bilateral investment treaty a provision to the effect that, in the interest of achieving the objects and goals of the treaty, the host State may incur international responsibility by reason of a breach of its contractual obligations towards the private investor of the other Party, the breach of contract being thus ‘internationalized’, i.e. assimilated to a breach of the treaty.

...[I]n including Art. II(2)(c) in the BIT, the Parties had as their aim to equate contractual obligations governed by municipal law to international treaty obligations as established in the BIT.

By reason therefore of the inclusion of Art. II(2)(c) in the BIT, the Tribunal therefore considers the Claimant’s claims of breach of contract on the basis that any such breach constitutes a breach of the BIT.

In the event, the Tribunal found that Romania had not violated its contractual obligation, and the Tribunal left open the question whether the wide scope of an umbrella clause has to be narrowed in some way.

The *Noble Ventures* Tribunal was not the first to accord a broad or full scope to the clause. In *SGS v Philippines*, the Tribunal, in its Decision on Jurisdiction,
also ruled that in the presence of an umbrella clause in the Philippines-Swiss BIT, a violation of an investment agreement will lead to a violation of the investment treaty: 'Article X(2) [the umbrella clause] means what it says.' The Tribunal stated:

Article X(2) makes it a breach of the BIT for the host State to fail to observe binding commitments, including contractual commitments, which it has assumed with regard to specific investments. But it does not convert the issue of the extent or content of such obligations into an issue of international law. That issue (in the present case, the issue of how much is payable for services provided under the CISS Agreement) is still governed by the investment agreement.

However, SGS v Philippines did not carry this approach to its logical conclusion. Instead the Tribunal assumed that, due to the existence of a forum selection clause in favour of the courts of the host state, the Philippine courts were to rule on the obligations contained in the investment contract.

In Eureko v Poland the Tribunal had to rule on the umbrella clause in Article 3.5 of the treaty between the Netherlands and Poland. The Tribunal considered the ordinary meaning, the context of the clause, and the maxim of effe utile. It concluded that breaches by Poland of its obligations under the contracts could be breaches of the BIT’s umbrella clause, even if they did not violate the BIT’s other standards. The Tribunal said:

The plain meaning—the ‘ordinary meaning’—of a provision prescribing that a State ‘shall observe any obligation it may have entered into’ with regard to certain foreign investment is not obscure. The phrase, ‘shall observe’ is imperative and categorical. ‘Any’ obligations is capacious; it means not only obligations of a certain type, but ‘any’—that is to say, all—obligations entered into with regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting Party. The context of Article 3.5 [the umbrella clause] is a Treaty whose object and purpose is ‘the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investment’, a treaty which contains specific provisions designed to accomplish that end, of which Article 3.5 is one. It is a cardinal rule of the interpretation of treaties that each and every operative clause of a treaty shall be interpreted as meaningful rather than meaningless.

In the event, the Tribunal found that Poland had violated its obligations arising from a privatization scheme vis-à-vis the investor.

According to the article:

299 At para 119.
300 At para 128. Emphasis in original.
301 At para 155.

The Philippine courts are available to hear SGS’s contract claim. Until the question of the scope or extent of the Respondent’s obligation to pay is clarified—whether by agreement between the parties or by proceedings in the Philippine courts as provided for in Article 12 of the CISS Agreement—a decision by this Tribunal on SGS’s claim to payment would be premature.


303 At paras 250.
304 At paras 246, 248.

The umbrella clause

In SGS v Paraguay the claim was for unpaid bills under a contract between the investor and the state for the pre-shipment inspection of goods. The BIT between Switzerland and Paraguay provided in Article 11 that ‘[e]ither Contracting Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party’. The Tribunal rejected a restrictive interpretation of this umbrella clause based either on the nature of the contract or on the nature of its breach. It said:

Article 11 does not exclude commercial contracts of the State from its scope. Likewise, Article 11 does not state that its constant guarantee of observance of such commitments may be breached only through actions that a commercial counterparty cannot take, through abuses of state power, or through exactions of undue government influence.

... Article 11 requires the ‘observance’ of commitments. Also as a matter of the ordinary meaning of the term, a failure to meet one’s obligations under a contract is clearly a failure to ‘observe’ one’s commitments. There is nothing in Article 11 that states or implies that a government will only fail to observe its commitments if it abuses its sovereign authority.

In a number of other decisions tribunals similarly gave full effect to umbrella clauses and confirmed that, by virtue of such a clause, failure by the host state to meet obligations assumed in relation to investments amounted to a breach of the treaty.

4) Restrictive application of umbrella clauses

In a series of other cases tribunals have imposed various limitations on the application of the umbrella clause. In SGS v Pakistan, the Swiss claimant had concluded a contract with Pakistan on pre-shipment inspection services with a forum selection clause for Pakistani courts. When Pakistan unilaterally terminated the contract, the claimant started proceedings at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the BIT between Pakistan and Switzerland. The BIT contained the following clause: ‘Either Contracting Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party.’

The Tribunal found that the proper mode of interpretation was a restrictive one (in dubio mitius). The Tribunal made no reference to the nodes of interpretation laid down in Article 31 of the VCLT which does not in its wording embrace

305 SGS v Paraguay, Decision on Jurisdiction, 12 February 2010, para 168.
306 SGS v Paraguay, Award, 10 February 2012, para 91.
309 SGS v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003.
310 At para 171.
this maxim. In light of this interpretative approach, the Tribunal concluded that any other understanding would have a far-reaching impact on the sovereignty of the host state which could not be presumed in the absence of a clear expression of a corresponding will by the parties.311

The Tribunal presented four arguments in support of this position. First, the conventional view would also cover non-contractual obligations arising under the laws of the host state, including the smallest types of commitment, and would lead to a flood of lawsuits before international tribunals.312 Second, the conventional view would make other guarantees in investment treaties superfluous because even a violation of a small obligation would allow a lawsuit.313 Thirdly, the Tribunal considered that the location of the umbrella clause not in the substantive guarantees but towards the end of the treaty spoke against a far-reaching obligation.314 And, fourthly, it pointed out that the forum selection in investment agreements would, under the conventional view, not be binding for the investor whereas the host state would be bound to honour such clauses.315 The Tribunal did not refer to the distinction between 'commercial acts' and 'sovereign acts'.

The Tribunal denied that its position would deprive an umbrella clause of its meaning. It pointed out that the clause would be relevant in the context of implementation of the investment treaty in the domestic legal order or if the host state failed to participate in international proceedings to which it had agreed earlier.316

This decision was widely criticized.317 The sharper criticism came from the Tribunal in SGS v Pakistan.318 But commentators also pointed to weaknesses of the decision.319 The most vulnerable aspect of the decision is the lack of any attempts to ground the method of interpretation in the accepted canons embodied in Article 31 of the VCLT.

For it while it seemed as though SGS v Pakistan would remain an isolated decision. But the decision has also found a measure of support.320 In 2006, two nearly identical decisions—in El Paso v Argentina321 and in Pan America v

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311 At paras 167, 168. 312 At paras 166, 168. 313 At para 168. 314 At paras 169, 170. 315 At para 172. 316 The Government of Switzerland took the unusual step of expressing its disapproval and concern over the decision in a letter of 1 October 2003 to the Deputy Secretary-General of ICISD.

317 SGS v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, para 125: 'Not only are the reasons given by the Tribunal in SGS v Pakistan unconvincing: the Tribunal failed to give any clear meaning to the "umbrella clause".' See also Eurocopter v Poland, Partial Award, 19 August 2003, para 257.


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The umbrella clause

ArgentinaC2—explicitly supported the first and second arguments set out in SGS v Pakistan (flood of lawsuits, overreach because of wider scope than other treaty guarantees).322 But unlike SGS v Pakistan, the Tribunals then introduced the distinction between the state as a merchant and the state as a sovereign. It concluded, with a broad brush, that investment arbitration will cover only disputes concerning investment agreements or state contracts in which the state is involved 'as a sovereign' but not mere commercial contracts.323 The Tribunal in El Paso sought to establish a balance between the interests of the host state and those of the investor:

This Tribunal considers that a balanced interpretation is needed, taking into account both State sovereignty and the State's responsibility to create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the development of economic activities, and the necessity to protect foreign investment and its continuing flow.325

Thus, the decisions in El Paso and in Pan American did not restrict the scope of the umbrella clause as drastically as SGS v Pakistan. They accept that obligations in investment agreements are covered by the clause to the extent that they bind the state in its sovereign capacity. Essentially, the two decisions seem to echo the French concept of contrat administratif.326

The distinction between different types of investment agreement was subsequently rejected in the Award in Siemens v Argentina327 where the Tribunal stated that:

The Tribunal does not subscribe to the view of the Respondent that investment agreements should be distinguished from concession agreements of an administrative nature. Such distinction has no basis in Article 7(2) of the Treaty which refers to 'any obligations', or in the definition of 'investment' in the Treaty. Any agreement related to an investment that qualifies as such under the Treaty would be part of the obligations covered under the umbrella clause.328

Another approach to limiting the effect of the umbrella clause does not look at the nature of the affected contract but at the nature or magnitude of its violation. The
Tribunal in *CMS v Argentina* referred to the distinction between governmental and commercial actions and the significance of the interference with the contract:

the tribunal believes the Respondent is correct in arguing that not all contract breaches result in breaches of the treaty. The standard of protection of the treaty will be engaged only when there is a specific breach of treaty rights and obligations or a violation of contract rights protected under the treaty. Purely commercial aspects of a contract might not be protected by the treaty in some situations, but the protection is likely to be available when there is significant interference by governments or public agencies with the rights of the investor.329

Similarly, in *Sempra v Argentina*330 the Tribunal held that ordinary commercial breaches of a contract would not violate the umbrella clause in the Argentina-US BIT. Only a breach in the exercise of a sovereign state function or power but not the conduct of an ordinary contract party could effect a breach. In the particular case, the Tribunal found that the sweeping changes that Argentina had introduced were not ordinary contractual breaches but had been brought about in exercise of the state’s public function. Therefore, it concluded that breaches of the obligations in question had resulted in a breach of the umbrella clause.331

An examination of the current strands of jurisprudence shows clearly conflicting positions. The survey of the jurisprudence interpreting the umbrella clause indicates that the understanding of the rule remains in a state of flux. However, a terminological observation and a comment on the discussion of the substance of the clause are appropriate at this stage. The terminological point concerns the distinction between ‘treaty claims’ and ‘contract claims’, introduced by the *Vivendi* Annulment Committee and subsequently often relied upon by tribunals.332 While the simplicity of the distinction may have seemed helpful for analytical purposes at the outset, the current position of jurisprudence on the umbrella clause suggests that the contrasting of ‘treaty claims’ and ‘contract claims’ does not facilitate an understanding of the scope of the clause. The crucial point lies in recognition that certain (or all) types of violations of contracts between the state and the investor will, in the presence of an umbrella clause, amount to a violation of the investment treaty.

States entering into an investment treaty are free to fashion the scope of the treaty and the guarantees granted therein. If the parties choose to extend the scope of the agreement beyond the confines of the classical understanding of an investment treaty and also cover, to some extent, operations previously deemed ‘commercial’ or ‘contractual’ in nature, conventional terminology cannot stand in the way of the parties’ intentions. For this reason, any attempt to define the scope of the umbrella clause by reference to abstract concepts such as ‘sovereign acts’, ‘commercial acts’, or ‘contrats administratifs’ will carry no methodological power of persuasion when it comes to interpreting and applying the clause. Ultimately, no justification exists for ignoring or revising the canons of interpretation laid down in Article 31 of the VCLT. References to conventional terminological distinctions or to categories of a specific domestic legal order have no place within this canon.

(d) Umbrella clauses and privity of contract

In principle, contracts to which an umbrella clause is to apply would be between the disputing parties, that is, a state and a foreign investor. But in some cases the disputing parties and the parties to the contract on which the investor relies for the purposes of the umbrella clause are not identical. On the host state’s side, the party to the contract may be a state entity or a territorial subdivision rather than the state itself. On the investor’s side, the party to the contract may not be the foreign investor itself but its subsidiary in the host state. In these situations, the question arises whether an umbrella clause will protect a contract that is not directly between the host state and the investor.333

*Noble Ventures v Romania*334 concerned a contract between the claimant and the Romanian ‘State Ownership Fund’, a separate legal entity. The Tribunal reached the conclusion that the contractual conduct of the Fund had to be attributed to the Romanian Government in view of the grant of governmental power to the Fund. The Tribunal found that, for the purposes of attribution, the distinction between commercial acts and sovereign acts had no relevance.335 It followed that the umbrella clause was applicable to the contract. The Tribunal said:

where the acts of a governmental agency are to be attributed to the State for the purposes of applying an umbrella clause, such as Art. II.2(c) of the BIT, breaches of a contract into which the State has entered are capable of constituting a breach of international law by virtue of the breach of the umbrella clause.336

In a series of other decisions, tribunals found that the umbrella clause was inapplicable where the state had not contracted in its own name.337 In *Impregilo v Pakistan*,338 the contracts had been concluded not with Pakistan directly but with the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority. The claimant wanted to benefit from an umbrella clause in a third country BIT by way of an MFN clause contained in the BIT between Italy and Pakistan. The Tribunal found that

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329 *CMS v Argentina*, Award, 12 May 2005, para 299.

330 *Sempra v Argentina*, Award, 28 September 2007.

331 At para 305–14.

332 *Vivendi v Argentina*, Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002, para 98, 101:

In a case where the essential basis of a claim brought before an international tribunal is a breach of contract, the tribunal will give effect to any valid choice of forum clause in the contract. . . On the other hand, where the fundamental basis of the claim is a treaty laying down an independent standard by which the conduct of the parties is to be judged, the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract between the claimant and the respondent state cannot operate as a bar to the application of the treaty stand-still.

Generally on the distinction between treaty claims and contract claims, see pp 261, 308, 272, 275–8.


334 *Noble Ventures v Romania*, Award, 12 October 2005.

335 *At para 82.

336 *At para 85, Emphasis in original.*


contracts concluded by a separate entity of Pakistan would not be protected by an umbrella clause. A similar problem arises on the investor's side when it operates through a local company that enters into a contract. The question then arises whether the foreign investor may rely on the umbrella clause in relation to a contract to which it is not a party. The ECT in Article 10(1) gives an affirmative answer to this question by referring to 'any obligations that it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor'.

Most BITs do not contain a clarification of this kind. The practice of tribunals is divided on whether foreign investors are entitled to protection under umbrella clauses for claims arising from the contracts of their local subsidiaries. Some tribunals have allowed claims of this nature.

In Continental Casualty v Argentina, the investor's local subsidiary, CNA, had entered into a number of contracts with Argentina. The claimant invoked the umbrella clause in respect of these contracts and the Tribunal left no doubt that the umbrella clause covered contracts concluded by the investor's subsidiary. The Tribunal stated, with respect to obligations covered by the umbrella clause in Article II(2)(c) of the Argentina-US BIT:

> provided that these obligations have been entered 'with regard' to investments, they may have been entered with persons or entities other than foreign investors themselves, so that an undertaking by the host State with a subsidiary such as CNA is not in principle excluded.

Other tribunals have similarly extended the effect of umbrella clauses to contracts entered into by local subsidiaries of the foreign investors.

In another group of cases, tribunals have concluded that successful invocation of the umbrella clause requires that the contract is directly with the foreign investor and not with its local subsidiary. In Azurix v Argentina, a concession agreement had been concluded between a province of Argentina and the subsidiary of Azurix ABA. The Tribunal recalled that Azurix and the respondent had no contractual relationship: the obligations undertaken in the concession contract were undertaken by the province, not Argentina, in favour of ABA, not Azurix. The Tribunal said:

> there is no undertaking to be honored by Argentina to Azurix other than the obligations under the BIT. Even if for argument's sake, it would be possible under Article II(2)(c) [the umbrella clause] to hold Argentina responsible for the alleged breaches of the Concession Agreement by the Province, it was ABA and not Azurix which was the party to this Agreement.

In CMS v Argentina, the claimant was a minority shareholder in a local company TGN. The Tribunal had allowed the application of the umbrella clause with respect to a licence obtained by TGN. In proceedings for the Award's annulment, the ad hoc Committee noted that under Argentinian law the obligations of Argentina under the licence were obligations to TGN, not to CMS. The Committee annulled the part of the Award dealing with the umbrella clause for failure to state reasons. In the Committee's view it was 'quite unclear how the Tribunal arrived at its conclusion that CMS could enforce the obligations of Argentina to TGN'.

(e) Umbrella clauses and unilateral acts

In the discussion of umbrella clauses, attention is mostly centred on contracts between the host state and the investor. However, states may assume obligations not only by way of contracts but also through unilateral declarations such as legislation and executive acts. Case law indicates that umbrella clauses are not restricted to contractual obligations but are capable of protecting obligations of the host state assumed unilaterally through legislation or executive acts.

Tribunals have recognized, in principle, that umbrella clauses in which states undertake to observe obligations with regard to investments cover unilateral undertakings. LG&E v Argentina involved an umbrella clause referring to the observance of 'any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments'. The case concerned the abrogation of rights granted to investors under a Gas Law and its implementing regulations. The Tribunal found that this legislation contained 'obligations' in the sense of the umbrella clause:
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These laws and regulations became obligations within the meaning of Article II(2)(c), by virtue of targeting foreign investors and applying specifically to their investments, that gave rise to liability under the umbrella clause.537 Some tribunals have read limitations into the clauses on the basis of the specific wording of umbrella clauses. A reference to obligations with regard to 'specific investments' was seen to exclude general legal obligations arising from legislative measures.538 Other tribunals have found that the words 'entered into' contained in an umbrella clause could only be read as restricting the clause to contractual undertakings.539 In Noble Ventures v Romania540 the Tribunal said:

The employment of the notion 'entered into' indicates that specific commitments are referred to and not general commitments, for example by way of legislative acts. This is also the reason why Art. II(2)(c) would be very much an empty base unless understood as referring to contracts.541

4. Access to justice, fair procedure, and denial of justice

The 2004 and 2012 US Model BITs in Article 5(2)(a) state that the FET standard includes the obligation 'not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world'. It would appear that even without such a specific reference, these principles are still covered, at least in part, by the requirement of full protection and security542 and by the rule on fair and equitable treatment.543 Also, it is plausible to assume that the US approach refers to the relevant: rules of customary law.

The standard will cover proceedings before the courts of the host state. However, depending on the wording of the treaty, it may also find application in the conduct of a party during arbitration proceedings, in particular if a party ignores a previous agreement to arbitrate.544 Generally, the principle of denial of justice applies to actions of all branches of a government.545 An international tribunal will decide independently whether the principle has been respected and will in this respect not be bound by the position of a domestic court.546

The principles of access to justice, fair procedure, and the prohibition of denial of justice relate to three stages of the judicial process: the right to bring a claim, the right of both parties to fair treatment during the proceedings, and the right to an appropriate decision at the end of the process and its enforcement. In Azniano v Mexico,547 the Tribunal summarized these criteria in the following terms:

A denial of justice could be pleaded if the relevant courts refuse to entertain a suit, if they subject it to undue delay, or if they administer justice in a seriously inadequate way. . . . There is a fourth type of denial of justice, namely the clear and malicious misapplication of the law.548

The principles of international law that apply during all phases set forth a broad framework which national rules have to respect. Essentially, these principles operate as the expression of an international standard that requires the establishment of a decent and civilized system of justice as reflected in accepted international and national practice. Thus, the concept of the minimum standard of international law549 has a substantive and a procedural side. So far, most issues of procedural propriety have in practice been reviewed under the standard of fair and equitable treatment, as discussed above.550

In Duke Energy v Ecuador,551 the Tribunal considered that the duty to provide effective access to justice 'seeks to implement and form part of the more general guarantee against denial of justice'.552 The case was brought by an investor who had concluded an arbitration agreement with a local Peruvian company subject to local law. In arbitration proceedings initiated by the investor in this local setting, the local arbitral tribunal had upheld a jurisdictional objection by the state, and the claimant did not challenge this award. The Tribunal did not agree with the claimant that Peru's conduct had failed to provide effective means to assert a claim.553

Access to justice, fair procedure, and denial of justice

537 At para 175.
538 SGS v Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2006, para 121.
539 CMS v Argentina, Decision on Annulment, 25 September 2007, para 95(c) and (b). See also Continental Casualty v Argentina, Award, 5 September 2008, paras 297–303.
540 Noble Ventures v Romania, Award, 12 October 2005.
541 At para 51.
542 See pp 160 et seq.
543 See pp 130 et seq.
544 In Waste Management v Mexico, Final Award, 30 April 2004, para 118–40, one issue was that a Mexican city refused to advance funds to cover the cost of local arbitration and the claimant then withdrew the case. The Tribunal ruled that the refusal of payment did not amount to a wrongful act.545 This case involved the improper intervention of the government in judicial proceedings. Due process and procedural fairness are not required for strictly internal governmental matters; see Bayindir v Pakistan, Award, 27 August 2009, paras 338 et seq.
546 See Feldman v Mexico, Award, 15 December 2002, para 140; Himparna v Indonesia, XXV ICSA YB Commercial Arbitration 109, 181. Tribunals have not yet spelt out in detail under what circumstances the misapplication of domestic law may lead to international responsibility; see Waste Management v Mexico, Award, 30 April 2004, para 129 et seq. As to the decision of lower courts, it is widely assumed that their rulings will not be considered to amount to an internationally wrongful act as long as a reasonable opportunity exists for the foreigner for appropriate review; see Ambasciatore Claim, ICJ Reports (1953) 10: Lorent v United States, Award, 26 June 2003, para 154.
547 Azniano v Mexico, Award, 1 November 1999.
548 At paras 102, 103. See also Memamo v United States, Award, 11 October 2002, paras 126–7.
549 See p 3.
551 See para 297.
552 Duke Energy v Ecuador, Award, 19 August 2008, para 391.
553 At para 391.
554 At para 390–403.
In *SGS v Paraguay* the claim was for unpaid bills under a contract between the investor and the state for the pre-shipment inspection of goods. The BIT between Switzerland and Paraguay provided in Article 11 that '[e]ither Contracting Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party'. The Tribunal rejected a restrictive interpretation of this umbrella clause based either on the nature of the contract or on the nature of its breach. It said:

Article 11 does not exclude commercial contracts of the State from its scope. Likewise, Article 11 does not state that its constant guarantee of observance of such commitments may be breached only through actions that a commercial counterparty cannot take, through abuses of state power, or through exertions of undue government influence.\(^{305}\)

... Article 11 requires the 'observance' of commitments. Also as a matter of the ordinary meaning of the term, a failure to meet one's obligations under a contract is clearly a failure to 'observe' one's commitments. There is nothing in Article 11 that states or implies that a government will only fail to observe its commitments if it abuses its sovereign authority.\(^{306}\)

In a number of other decisions tribunals similarly gave full effect to umbrella clauses and confirmed that, by virtue of such a clause, failure by the host state to meet obligations assumed in relation to investments amounted to a breach of the treaty.\(^{307}\)

(c) Restrictive application of umbrella clauses

In a series of other cases tribunals have imposed various limitations on the application of the umbrella clause.\(^{308}\) In *SGS v Pakistan*\(^{309}\) the Swiss claimant had concluded a contract with Pakistan on pre-shipment inspection services with a forum selection clause for Pakistani courts. When Pakistan unilaterally terminated the contract, the claimant started proceedings at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the BIT between Pakistan and Switzerland. The BIT contained the following clause: 'Either Contracting Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the other Contracting Party.'

The Tribunal found that the proper mode of interpretation was a restrictive one (*in dubio mitius*).\(^{310}\) The Tribunal made no reference to the modes of interpretation laid down in Article 31 of the VCLT which does not in its wording embrace

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\(^{305}\) *SGS v Paraguay*, Decision on Jurisdiction, 12 February 2010, para 168.

\(^{306}\) *SGS v Paraguay*, Award, 10 February 2012, para 91.


\(^{309}\) *SGS v Pakistan*, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003.

\(^{310}\) At para 171.
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this maxim. In light of this interpretative approach, the Tribunal concluded that any other understanding would have a far-reaching impact on the sovereignty of the host state which could not be presumed in the absence of a clear expression of a corresponding will by the parties.311

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The Tribunal denied that its position would deprive an umbrella clause of its meaning. It pointed out that the clause would be relevant in the context of implementation of the investment treaty in the domestic legal order or if the host state failed to participate in international proceedings to which it had agreed earlier.316

This decision was widely criticized.317 The sharpest criticism came from the Tribunal in SGS v Philippines,318 but commentators also pointed to weaknesses of the decision.319 The most vulnerable aspect of the decision is the lack of any attempt to ground the method of interpretation in the accepted canons embodied in Article 31 of the VCLT.

For a while it seemed as though SGS v Pakistan would remain an isolated decision. But the decision has also found a measure of support.320 In 2006, two nearly identical decisions—in El Paso v Argentina321 and in Pan America v

311 At paras 167, 168. 312 At paras 166, 168. 313 At para 168. 314 At para 169. 315 At para 168. 316 At para 172. 317 The Government of Switzerland took the unusual step of expressing its disapproval and concern over the decision in a letter of 1 October 2003 to the Deputy Secretary-General of ICSID.

318 SGS v Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, para 125: ‘Not only are the reasons given by the Tribunal in SGS v Pakistan unconvincing: the Tribunal failed to give any clear meaning to the “umbrella clause”. See also Eureko v Poland, Partial Award, 19 August 2005, para 257.


Argentina322—ex Pakistan (flood of guarantees).323 The distinction between concluded, with concerning investor ‘as a sovereign’ sought to establish investor:

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This Tribunal considers that a balanced interpretation is needed, taking into account both State sovereignty and the State’s responsibility to create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the development of economic activities, and the necessity to protect foreign investment and its continuing flow.

Thus, the decisions in El Paso and in Pan American did not restrict the scope of the umbrella clause as drastically as SGS v Pakistan. They accept that obligations in investment agreements are covered by the clause to the extent that they bind the state in its sovereign capacity. Essentially, the two decisions seem to echo the French concept of contrat administratif.

The distinction between different types of investment agreement was subsequently rejected in the Award in Siemens v Argentina where the Tribunal stated that:

The Tribunal does not subscribe to the view of the Respondent that investment agreements should be distinguished from concession agreements of an administrative nature. Such distinction has no basis in Article 7(2) of the Treaty which refers to ‘any obligations’, or in the definition of ‘investment’ in the Treaty. Any agreement related to an investment that qualifies as such under the Treaty would be part of the obligations covered under the umbrella clause.

Another approach to limiting the effect of the umbrella clause does not look at the nature of the affected contract but at the nature or magnitude of its violation. The

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322 Pan American/BP v Argentina, Decision on Preliminary Objections, 27 July 2006; two out of the three arbitrators were the same as in the El Paso decision.
324 See El Paso Energy v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 April 2006, paras 77 et seq; Pan American/BP v Argentina, Decision on Preliminary Objections, 27 July 2006, para 108; in Salini v Jordan, Award, 31 January 2006, para 155, the Tribunal had stated, in categorical terms: ‘Only the State, in the exercise of its sovereign authority, and not as a contracting party, has assumed obligations under the bilateral agreement.’
325 El Paso Energy v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 April 2006, para 70.
326 This position is contrary to the position taken by arbitrator René-Jean Dupuy in Tececo v Libya, 53 I.L.R (1979) 389, para 72 who had held that the theory of administrative contracts had no place in international law. See also ARAMCO v Saudi Arabia, 72 I.L.R (1963) 117, 164.
327 Siemens v Argentina, Award, 6 February 2007.
328 At para 206.
Tribunal in CMS v Argentina referred to the distinction between governmental and commercial actions and the significance of the interference with the contract: the tribunal believes the Respondent is correct in arguing that not all contract breaches result in breaches of the treaty. The standard of protection of the treaty will be engaged only when there is a specific breach of treaty rights and obligations or a violation of contract rights protected under the treaty. Purely commercial aspects of a contract might not be protected by the treaty in some situations, but the protection is likely to be available when there is significant interference by governments or public agencies with the rights of the investor.329

Similarly, in Sempra v Argentina330 the Tribunal held that ordinary commercial breaches of a contract would not violate the umbrella clause in the Argentina-US BIT. Only a breach in the exercise of a sovereign state function or power but not the conduct of an ordinary contract party could effect a breach. In the particular case, the Tribunal found that the sweeping changes that Argentina had introduced were not ordinary contractual breaches but had been brought about in exercise of the state’s public function. Therefore, it concluded that breaches of the obligations in question had resulted in a breach of the umbrella clause.331

An examination of the current strands of jurisprudence shows clearly conflicting positions. The survey of the jurisprudence interpreting the umbrella clause indicates that the understanding of the rule remains in a state of flux. However, a terminological observation and a comment on the discussion of the substance of the clause are appropriate at this stage. The terminological point concerns the distinction between ‘treaty claims’ and ‘contract claims’, introduced by the Vivendi Annulment Committee and subsequently often relied upon by tribunals.332 While the simplicity of the distinction may have seemed helpful for analytical purposes at the outset, the current position of jurisprudence on the umbrella clause suggests that the contrasting of ‘treaty claims’ and ‘contract claims’ does not facilitate an understanding of the scope of the clause. The crucial point lies in recognition that certain (or all) types of violations of contracts between the state and the investor will, in the presence of an umbrella clause, amount to a violation of the investment treaty.

States entering into an investment treaty are free to fashion the scope of the treaty and the guarantees granted therein. If the parties choose to extend the scope of the agreement beyond the confines of the classical understanding of an investment treaty and also cover, to some extent, operations previously deemed ‘commercial’ or ‘contractual’ in nature, conventional terminology cannot stand in the way of the parties’ umbrella clause by reference to categories of commercial acts, or ‘commercial’ when it comes to situations where the justification exists in Article 31 of the convention.

(d) Umbrella clause

In principle, conflicting positions emerge when the disputing parties offer different interpretations of the ‘commercial’ purposes of the umbrella clause. The Tribunal in Noble Ventures Romanian State v Romania held that the conclusion that a breach of the umbrella clause had occurred only when the acts of a host state have an essential basis in a treaty obligation.333 In a series of other cases,334 the Tribunal has indicated a similar approach, where the acts of a host state are deemed to benefit from a treaty obligation when the State has a special jurisdiction clause in a contract which the State has to benefit from a contract contained in that clause.

329 CMS v Argentina, Award, 12 May 2005, para 299.
330 Sempra v Argentina, Award, 28 September 2007.
331 At paras 305–14.
332 Vivendi v Argentina, Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002, paras 98, 101:
In a case where the essential basis of a claim brought before an international tribunal is a breach of contract, the tribunal will give effect to any valid choice of forum clause in the contract. . . . On the other hand, where the fundamental basis of the claim is a treaty laying down an independent standard by which the conduct of the parties is to be judged, the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract between the claimant and the respondent state cannot operate as a bar to the application of the treaty standard.
Generally on the distinction between treaty claims and contract claims, see pp 261, 268, 272, 275–8.
The umbrella clause

way of the parties' intentions. For this reason, any attempt to define the scope of the umbrella clause by reference to abstract concepts such as 'sovereign acts', 'commercial acts', or 'contrats administratifs' will carry no methodological power of persuasion when it comes to interpreting and applying the clause. Ultimately, no justification exists for ignoring or revising the canons of interpretation laid down in Article 31 of the VCLT. References to conventional terminological distinctions or to categories of a specific domestic legal order have no place within this canon.

(d) Umbrella clauses and privity of contract

In principle, contracts to which an umbrella clause is to apply would be between the disputing parties, that is, a state and a foreign investor. But in some cases the disputing parties and the parties to the contract on which the investor relies for the purposes of the umbrella clause are not identical. On the host state's side, the party to the contract may be a state entity or a territorial subdivision rather than the state itself. On the investor’s side, the party to the contract may not be the foreign investor itself but its subsidiary in the host state. In these situations, the question arises whether an umbrella clause will protect a contract that is not directly between the host state and the investor.333

*Noble Ventures v Romania*334 concerned a contract between the claimant and the Romanian ‘State Ownership Fund’, a separate legal entity. The Tribunal reached the conclusion that the contractual conduct of the Fund had to be attributed to the Romanian Government in view of the grant of governmental power to the Fund. The Tribunal found that, for the purposes of attribution, the distinction between commercial acts and sovereign acts had no relevance.335 It followed that the umbrella clause was applicable to the contract. The Tribunal said:

where the acts of a governmental agency are to be attributed to the State for the purposes of applying an umbrella clause, such as Art. II(2)(c) of the BIT, breaches of a contract into which the State has entered are capable of constituting a breach of international law by virtue of the breach of the umbrella clause.336

In a series of other decisions, tribunals found that the umbrella clause was inapplicable where the state had not contracted in its own name.337 In *Impregilo v Pakistan*,338 the contracts had been concluded not with Pakistan directly but with the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority. The claimant wanted to benefit from an umbrella clause in a third country BIT by way of an MFN clause contained in the BIT between Italy and Pakistan. The Tribunal found that

334 *Noble Ventures v Romania*, Award, 12 October 2005.
335 At para 82.
336 At para 85. Emphasis in original.
that the fundamental basis of the claim before them was the same as before the domestic courts.\textsuperscript{167}

CMS v Argentina\textsuperscript{168} addressed the fork-in-the-road provision in the Argentina-US BIT. Argentina argued that the investor had taken the fork in the road since the local company, TGN, in which the investor held shares, had appealed a judicial decision to the Federal Supreme Court and had sought other administrative remedies.\textsuperscript{169}

The Tribunal rejected Argentina’s contention. It pointed out that the appeal had been taken by the local company TGN rather than by the foreign investor. Also, the steps taken consisted only of defensive and reactive actions. Most importantly, the subject matter in the domestic proceedings was not the same as the one in the ICSID arbitration. TGN’s claims concerned the contractual arrangements under a licence while those of CMS concerned treaty rights.\textsuperscript{170} The Tribunal said:

80. Decisions of several ICSID tribunals have held that as contractual claims are different from treaty claims, even if TGN had done so—which is not the case,—this would not result in triggering the ‘fork in the road’ provision against CMS. Both the parties and the causes of action under separate instruments are different.

\textit{cc. An attempt at amicable settlement}

A common condition in treaties providing for investor-state arbitration is that an amicable settlement must first be attempted through consultations or negotiations. This requirement is subject to certain time limits ranging from 3 to 12 months. If no settlement is reached within that period the claimant may proceed to arbitration. A typical waiting period under BITs would be six months. The NAFTA (Art 1118–20) also prescribes a waiting period of six months after the events giving rise to the claim.\textsuperscript{171} Article 26(2) of the ECT offers consent to arbitration if the dispute cannot be settled within three months from the date on which either party requested amicable settlement.\textsuperscript{172} National legislation offering consent to arbitration may similarly provide for waiting periods.\textsuperscript{173}

The reaction of tribunals to these provisions requiring an attempt at amicable settlement before the institution of arbitration has not been uniform.\textsuperscript{174} In the majority of cases the tribunals found that the claimants had complied with these waiting periods before proceeding to arbitration.\textsuperscript{175} In other cases the tribunals found that non-compliance with the waiting periods did not affect their jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{176}

In Biwater Gauff v Tanzania, the UK-Tanzania BIT provided for a six-month period for settlement. There had been attempts to resolve the dispute but the six-month period had not yet elapsed when the Request for Arbitration was filed. The Tribunal held that this did not preclude it from proceeding. It said:

this six-month period is procedural and directory in nature, rather than jurisdictional and mandatory. Its underlying purpose is to facilitate opportunities for amicable settlement. Its purpose is not to impede or obstruct arbitration proceedings, where such settlement is not possible. Non-compliance with the six month period, therefore, does not preclude this Arbitral Tribunal from proceeding. If it did so, the provision would have curious effects, including:

- preventing the prosecution of a claim, and forcing the claimant to do nothing until six months have elapsed, even where further negotiations are obviously futile, or settlement obviously impossible for any reason;
- forcing the claimant to recommence an arbitration started too soon, even if the six-month period has elapsed by the time the Arbitral Tribunal considers the matter.\textsuperscript{177}


\textit{176} In Ethyl Corp v Canada, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 June 1998, paras 76–88, the Tribunal dismissed the objection based on the six-month provision since further negotiations would have been pointless. In Lavender v Czech Republic, Final Award, 3 September 2001, para 187, the Tribunal found that the waiting period of six months was not a jurisdictional provision. In SGS v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, para 184, the Tribunal found that the waiting period was procedural rather than jurisdictional and that negotiations would have been futile. Similarly in Bayindir v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005, para 88–103, the Tribunal found that a requirement to give notice of the dispute for the purpose of reaching a negotiated settlement was not a precondition for jurisdiction.

\textit{177} Biwater Gauff v Tanzania, Award, 24 July 2008, paras 358–50 at 345.
Other tribunals have reached the opposite conclusion. In Burlington Resources v Ecuador, the BIT between Ecuador and the United States provided for consultation and negotiation in the event of a dispute. ICSID arbitration would become available six months after the dispute had arisen. The Tribunal found that the claimant had only informed the respondent of the dispute with its submission of the dispute to ICSID arbitration. It followed that the claim was inadmissible:

by imposing upon investors an obligation to voice their disagreement at least six months prior to the submission of an investment dispute to arbitration, the Treaty effectively accords host States the right to be informed about the dispute at least six months before it is submitted to arbitration. The purpose of this right is to grant the host State an opportunity to redress the problem before the investor submits the dispute to arbitration. In this case, Claimant has deprived the host State of that opportunity. That suffices to defeat jurisdiction.

It would seem that the decisive question is whether there was a promising opportunity for a settlement. There is little point in declining jurisdiction and sending the parties back to the negotiating table if negotiations are obviously futile. Even if the institution of arbitration was premature, the waiting period will often have expired by the time the tribunal is ready to make a decision on jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, declining jurisdiction and compelling the claimant to start the proceedings anew would be uneconomical. An alternative way to deal with non-compliance with a waiting period is a suspension of proceedings to allow additional time for negotiations if these appear promising.

(h) The applicability of MFN clauses to dispute settlement

An MFN clause contained in a treaty will extend the better treatment granted to a third state or its nationals to a beneficiary of the treaty. Most BITs and some other treaties for the protection of investments contain MFN clauses. Some of these MFN clauses will specify to which parts of the treaty they apply. For instance, the MFN clause may specify that it includes, or that it excludes, dispute settlement. But most MFN clauses are worded in a general way and typically refer only to the treatment of investments.

This has led to the question of whether the effect of MFN clauses extends to the provisions on dispute settlement in these treaties. Put differently, is it possible to avoid the conditions and limitations attached to consent to arbitration in a treaty by relying on an MFN clause in the treaty provided the respondent state has entered into a treaty with a third state that contains a consent clause without these conditions and limitations? Or even more radically, if the treaty containing the MFN clause does not offer consent to arbitration, is it possible to rely on consent to arbitration in a treaty of the respondent state with a third party?

In Maffezini v Spain the consent clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT required resort to the host state's domestic courts for 18 months before the institution of arbitration. That BIT contained the following MFN clause: 'In all matters subject to this Agreement, this treatment shall not be less favorable than that extended by each Party to the investments made in its territory by investors of a third country.'

On the basis of that clause, the Argentinian claimant relied on the Chile-Spain BIT which does not contain the requirement to seek redress in the host state's courts for 18 months. The Tribunal undertook a detailed analysis of the applicability of MFN clauses to dispute settlement arrangements and concluded:

the most favored nation clause included in the Argentine-Spain BIT embraces the dispute settlement provisions of this treaty... the Tribunal concludes that Claimant had the right to submit the instant dispute to arbitration without first accessing the Spanish courts.

At the same time, the Maffezini Tribunal warned against exaggerated expectations attached to the operation of MFN clauses and distinguished between the legitimate extension of rights and benefits and disruptive treaty-shopping. In particular, the MFN clause should not override public policy considerations that the contracting parties had in mind as fundamental conditions for their acceptance of the agreement.

Subsequent decisions dealing with the application of MFN clauses to the requirement to seek a settlement in domestic courts for 18 months have mostly adopted the same solution. The tribunals confirmed that the claimants were entitled to rely on the MFN clause in the applicable treaty to invoke the more favourable dispute settlement clause of another treaty that did not contain the 18-month rule. At the same time these tribunals expressed their conviction that arbitration was an important part of the protection of foreign investors and that MFN clauses...
In the absence of such an agreement, it provides for the application of the host state's law and international law:

**Article 42**

(1) The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.

Both the UNCITRAL Rules (Art 35(1)) and the ICC Rules (Art 21(1)) state that a tribunal will apply the law designated by the parties. If there is no choice of law clause, the UNCITRAL Rules refer to 'the law which it determines to be appropriate' and to 'any usage of trade applicable to the transaction' which the tribunal shall take into account (Art 35(3)). For ICC proceedings, its Rules provide in such a case that the Tribunal 'shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate' (Art 21(1)) and that the Tribunal 'shall take account of the provisions of the contract, if any, between the parties and of any relevant trade usages' (Art 21(2)).

Many of the treaty provisions that offer investor-state arbitration, such as the NAFTA, the ECT, and some BITs, also contain provisions on applicable law. By taking up the offer of arbitration, the investor also accepts the choice of law clause contained in the treaty's dispute settlement provision. In this way, the treaty's provision on applicable law becomes part of the arbitration agreement. In other words, the clause on applicable law in the treaty becomes a choice of law agreed by the parties to the arbitration.301

Some clauses in treaties governing the applicable law in investment disputes refer exclusively to international law. For instance, Chapter 11, Section B of the NAFTA, dealing with the settlement of investor-state disputes, refers only to international law including the NAFTA itself:

**Article 1131: Governing law**

1. A Tribunal established under this Section shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of international law.302

Similarly, the ECT's provision on investor-state dispute settlement provides:

**Article 26 Settlement of disputes between an investor and a contracting party**

(6) A tribunal established under paragraph (4) shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international law.303

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A number of BITs also merely refer to international law including the substantive rules of the BIT itself.\(^\text{304}\)

Other BITs, in provisions dealing with applicable law, combine the host state’s domestic law with international law. A frequently used formula lists: (a) the host state’s law; (b) the BIT itself as well as other treaties; (c) any contract relating to the investment; and (d) general international law. In \textit{Antoine Goetz v Burundi}\(^\text{305}\) the relevant Belgium-Burundi BIT contained a provision on applicable law of this type. The Tribunal found that it had to apply a combination of domestic law and international law.\(^\text{306}\) The Tribunal made the following general statement:

A complementary relationship must be allowed to prevail. That the Tribunal must apply Burundian law is beyond doubt, since this last is also cited in the first place by the relevant provision of the Belgium-Burundi investment treaty. As regards international law, its application is obligatory for two reasons. First, because, according to the indications furnished to the Tribunal by the claimants, Burundian law seems to incorporate international law and thus to render it directly applicable; . . . Furthermore, because the Republic of Burundi is bound by the international law obligations which it freely assumed under the Treaty for the protection of investments . . .\(^\text{307}\)

The Tribunal then stated that an application of international law and of domestic law might lead to different results. The Tribunal first undertook an analysis of the dispute from the perspective of the law of Burundi. This analysis led to the conclusion that under the law of Burundi the actions in question were legal.\(^\text{308}\) The Tribunal then examined the same issue from the perspective of international law, in particular in light of the BIT. This examination led to the result that the legality of the measures taken by Burundi depended on the payment of adequate and effective compensation which was still outstanding.\(^\text{309}\)

A slightly different provision on applicable law that combines host state law and international law may be found in the BIT between Argentina and Spain:

The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, the terms of other Agreements concluded between the parties, the law of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was made, including its rules on conflict of laws, and general principles of international law.\(^\text{310}\)

That treaty provision was applicable in \textit{Maffezini v Spain}\(^\text{311}\) where the subject of the dispute was the construction of a chemical plant. The Tribunal did not enter into a theoretical discussion on the law applicable to the case before it; it applied international law, instance, on the entity the Tribunal question of attr. Common Admi entity.\(^\text{313}\) Havit BIT.\(^\text{314}\) On the international law and the BIT.\(^\text{318}\) the investor an and the Spanish On the issue of that it did not:

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\(^{305}\) \textit{Antoine Goetz v Burundi}, Award, 10 February 1999.

\(^{306}\) At para 95.

\(^{307}\) At para 98.

\(^{308}\) At paras 100–19.

\(^{309}\) At paras 120–33.

\(^{310}\) Argentina-Spain BIT, Art 10(5).

\(^{311}\) \textit{Maffezini v Spain}, Award, 13 November 2000.

\(^{312}\) At paras 5

\(^{313}\) At para 67

\(^{314}\) At para 71

\(^{315}\) At paras 9 Final Award, 24:

\(^{316}\) par 81–90.

\(^{317}\) \textit{AAPL v S}

\(^{318}\) At para 20

\(^{319}\) At paras 1

\(^{320}\) \textit{Wena Ho} 2 October 2006

\(^{321}\) 85, 97–8; \textit{Saiper} 2009, paras 109
international law to some questions and host state law to other questions. For instance, on the issue of whether Spain was responsible for the actions of a state entity the Tribunal relied on the international law of state responsibility for the question of attribution and on the Spanish Law on Public Administration and Common Administrative Procedure to elucidate the structure and functions of the entity. Having reached an affirmative reply on attribution, it then applied the BIT. On the issue of an environmental impact assessment, the Tribunal applied international law, Spanish legislation, a European Community directive, and the BIT. To the question of whether a contract had been perfected between the investor and the state entity, the Tribunal applied the Spanish Civil Code and the Spanish Commercial Code together with authoritative commentaries. On the issue of a statute of limitation under Spanish legislation, the Tribunal found that it did not apply to claims filed under the ICSID Convention.

Not all BITs contain provisions on applicable law. Where jurisdiction is based on a BIT that does not contain a provision on governing law, tribunals have sometimes construed such a choice from the BIT’s invocation.

In AAPL v Sri Lanka, jurisdiction was based on the BIT between Sri Lanka and the United Kingdom. This BIT did not contain a provision on applicable law. The Tribunal found that by arguing their case on the basis of the BIT, the parties had expressed their choice of the BIT as the applicable law as ‘both Parties acted in a manner that demonstrates their mutual agreement to consider the provisions of the Sri Lanka/UK Bilateral Investment Treaty as being the primary source of the applicable legal rules’. The Tribunal in AAPL v Sri Lanka went on to state that the BIT was not a closed legal system but had to be seen in a wider juridical context. This wider juridical context, as well as the parties’ submissions, led it to apply customary international law as well as domestic law. Other tribunals have similarly found that in cases involving disputes under BITs the primary source of law had to be the BIT itself and other rules of international law.

In the absence of an agreement on the governing law, Article 42 of the ICSID Convention provides that the tribunal apply host state law and applicable rules of international law. Most tribunals applying this provision examined the issues before

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112 At paras 50, 52, 57, 77, 83.
113 At paras 47–9.
114 At para 83.
115 At para 67.
116 At paras 68, 69.
117 At para 69.
118 At para 71.
119 At paras 89, 90.
120 At paras 92, 93. For a similar methodology on applicable law, see also BG Group v Argentina, Final Award, 24 December 2007, paras 89–103; National Grid v Argentina, Award, 3 November 2008, paras 81–90.
121 AAPL v Sri Lanka, Award, 27 June 1990.
122 At para 20.
123 At paras 18–24.
124 Wena Hotels v Egypt, Award, 8 December 2000, paras 78, 79; ADC v Hungary, Award, 2 October 2006, paras 288–91; IGEF v Argentina, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, paras 85, 97–8; Sapreau v Bangladesh, Award, 30 June 2009, para 99; Bayindir v Pakistan, Award, 27 August 2009, paras 109, 110.
them under both systems of law. In some cases the tribunals were simply content to find that both systems of law reached the same result.326

A widely held theory on the relationship of international law to host state law under the second sentence of Article 42(1) is the doctrine of the supplemental and corrective function of international law vis-à-vis domestic law.327 The ad hoc Committee in Amco v Indonesia described this doctrine as follows:

Article 42(1) of the Convention authorizes an ICSID tribunal to apply rules of international law only to fill up lacunae in the applicable domestic law and to ensure precedence to international law norms where the rules of the applicable domestic law are in collision with such norms.328

It is questionable whether this doctrine accurately reflects reality. Tribunals have given international law more than a mere ancillary or subsidiary role. The Tribunal in the resubmitted case of Amco v Indonesia called this a distinction without a difference:

40. This Tribunal notes that Article 42(1) refers to the application of host-state law and international law. If there are no relevant host-state laws on a particular matter, a search must be made for the relevant international laws. And, where there are applicable host-state laws, they must be checked against international laws, which will prevail in case of conflict. Thus international law is fully applicable and to classify its role as 'only' 'supplemental and corrective' seems a distinction without a difference.329

Under the residual rule of Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention both legal systems, that is international law and host state law, have a role to play.330 In CMS v Argentina the Tribunal said:

there is here a close interaction between the legislation and the regulations governing the gas privatization, the License and international law, as embodied both in the Treaty and in

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325 But see SOABI v Senegal, Award, 25 February 1988, paras 5.02 et seq where the Tribunal restricted itself to the application of Senegalese law.
326 Adriano Garde/IA v Côte d'Ivoire, Award, 29 August 1977, para 4.3; Benvenuti & Bonfanti v Congo, Award, 15 August 1980, para 4.64; Klöckner v Cameroon, Award, 21 October 1983, 2 ICSID Reports 9, at p 63; Amco v Indonesia, Award, 20 November 1984, paras 147-8, 188, 201, 245-50, 265-8, 281; Duke Energy v Peru, Award, 18 August 2008, paras 144-61; Aguytia v Peru, Award, 11 December 2008, paras 71-4.
327 Klöckner v Cameroon, Decision on Annulment, 3 May 1985, para 69; LETCO v Liberia, Award, 31 March 1986, 2 ICSID Reports 343, at 358-9; Amco v Indonesia, Resubmitted Case: Award, 5 June 1990, para 38; SPP v Egypt, Award, 20 May 1992, para 84; Autopista v Venezuela, Award, 23 September 2003, paras 101-5.
328 Amco v Indonesia, Decision on Annulment, 16 May 1986, para 20.
329 Amco v Indonesia, Resubmitted Case: Award, 5 June 1990, para 40.
331 CMS v Argentina, 5 Feb 2002, para 77.
332 LG&E v Argentina, 22 May 2007, para 47.
333 LG&E v Argentina, Award, 17 February 2006, para 162.
336 Articles on R v Delmas, J Crawford
customary international law. All of these rules are inseparable and will, to the extent justified, be applied by the Tribunal. 331

It is only where there is a conflict between the host state's law and international law that a tribunal has to make a decision on precedence. The Tribunal in LG&E v Argentina emphasized that ultimately international law is controlling: 'International law overrides domestic law when there is a contradiction since a State cannot justify non-compliance of its international obligations by asserting the provisions of its domestic law.' 332

In non-ICSID arbitration between investors and host states, tribunals also apply a combination of international law and host state law. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules refer the tribunal to the law designated by the parties. In the absence of a choice of law, the tribunal is to apply the law which it determines to be appropriate. 333

In Occidental v Ecuador the arbitration was conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules of 1976. The Tribunal listed a mix of sources of law under host state law and under international law:

The dispute in the present case is related to various sources of applicable law. It is first related to the Contract...; it is next related to Ecuadorian tax legislation; this is followed by specific Decisions adopted by the Andean Community and issues that arise under the law of the WTO. In particular the dispute is related to the rights and obligations of the parties under the Treaty [ie the US-Ecuador BIT] and international law. 334

Therefore, in most cases the applicable substantive law in investment arbitration combines international law and host state law. This is so whether or not the parties have made a choice of law that combines international law with host state law. In the majority of cases tribunals have, in fact, applied both systems of law. Where there was a contradiction between the two, international law had to prevail. It is left to the tribunals to identify the various issues before them to which international law or host state law is to apply.

(I) Remedies

aa. Restitution and satisfaction

Under the international law of state responsibility, reparation for a wrongful act takes the form of restitution, compensation, or satisfaction. 335 In investment

331 CMS v Argentina, Award, 12 May 2005, para 117. See also Wena v Egypt, Decision on Annullment, 5 February 2002, paras 37–40; Azurix v Argentina, Award, 14 July 2006, para 67; LG&E v Argentina, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, paras 82–99; Enron v Argentina, Award, 22 May 2007, paras 203–9; Tokio Tokelés v Ukraine, Award, 26 July 2007, paras 138–45; Sempra v Argentina, Award, 28 September 2007, paras 253–40.
332 LG&E v Argentina, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, para 94. See also CDSE v Costa Rica, Award, 17 February 2000, paras 64, 65; Duke Energy v Peru, Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 February 2006, para 162.
334 Occidental v Ecuador, Final Award, 1 July 2004, para 93. See also Eastern Sugar v Czech Republic, Partial Award, 27 March 2007, paras 191–7.
the case-law elaborated by international arbitral tribunals strongly suggests that in assessing the liability due for losses incurred the interest becomes an integral part of the compensation itself, and should run consequently from the date when the State’s international responsibility became engaged. 363

In the case of compensation, interest is normally due from the date of the expropriation, although that date may be difficult to determine with indirect or creeping expropriations. The appropriate date will be the day when the investor definitely lost control over the investment.

The rate of interest may be calculated on the basis of the legal interest rate in an applicable legal system or on an inter-bank rate such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). 364

The practice of tribunals shows a trend towards compounding interest, that is, interest is capitalized at certain intervals and will then itself bear interest. While some tribunals have rejected compound interest, 365 it has been accepted in the majority of recent decisions. 366

(m) Costs

The costs of major investment arbitrations can be considerable and may run into millions of dollars for complex cases. 367 The costs consist of three elements: the charges for the use of the facilities and expenses of ICSID 368 or other arbitration institution, the fees and expenses of the arbitrators, and the expenses incurred by the parties in connection with the arbitration.

The ICSID rules provide that the seat of the arbitration shall be Paris, thus conferring upon the ICSID tribunal the power to fix the costs of the arbitration. 369

The practice in investment arbitrations is that costs are allocated equally between the parties, with some tribunals awarding the costs in the event of non-compliance with the tribunal’s rules. 369

This decision is to participate in the also undertaken arbitration. 372

More recently that costs follow

363 AAIP v Sri Lanka, Award, 27 June 1990, para 114. See also SPP v Egypt, Award, 20 May 1992, para 234; Metalclad Corp v United Mexican States, Award, 30 August 2000, para 128.

364 PSEG v Turkey, Award, 19 January 2007, para 348; Sempra v Argentina, Award, 28 September 2007, paras 483–6; Rumel Telekom v Kazakhstan, Award, 29 July 2008, para 818; National Grid v Argentina, Award, 3 November 2008, para 291; Siag v Egypt, Award, 1 June 2009, para 594–8.


366 Atlantic Triton v Guinea, Award, 21 April 1986, 3 ICSID Reports 13, at 33, 43; Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v Costa Rica, Award, 17 February 2000, paras 104, 105; Metalclad v Mexico, Award, 30 August 2000, para 128; Maffezini v Spain, Award, 13 November 2000, para 96; Wena Hotels v Egypt, Award, 8 December 2000, para 129; Middle East Cement v Egypt, Award, 12 April 2002, para 174; Pope & Talbot v Canada, Award in Respect of Damages, 31 May 2002, para 90; Tecmed v United Mexican States, Award, 29 May 2003, para 196; MTD v Chile, Award, 25 May 2004, para 253(4); Azurix v Argentina, Award, 14 July 2006, paras 439–40; ADC v Hungary, Award, 2 October 2006, para 522; PSEG v Turkey, Award, 19 January 2007, para 348; Enron v Argentina, Award, 22 May 2007, paras 451–2; Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, SA v Vinesdi Universal v Argentina, Award, 20 August 2007, paras 9.1.1–9.2.8; BG Group v Argentina, Final Award, 24 December 2007, para 456–7; Sempra v Argentina, Award, 28 September 2007, paras 483–6; OKO Pankki v Estonia, Award, 19 November 2007, paras 343–56; Continental Canadá v Argentina, Award, 5 September 2008, paras 306–16; Pannekoek v Zimbabwe, Award, 22 April 2009, para 141–6; Siag v Egypt, Award, 1 June 2009, paras 594–8; Inpreqigl v Argentina, Award, 21 June 2011, para 382–4.

367 Eg in PSEG v Turkey, the total amount of costs claimed was US$20,851,636.62. See Award, 19 January 2007, para 352. The Award in Libananco v Turkey, 2 September 2011, para 558–9, seems to have set a record with combined costs for both parties at US$60 million.


369 Article 42, 1 October 2003 ICSID Reports Indonesia, Resubm 16 February 1994, 8.06; Tradex v Al, Award, 1 November Maffezini v Spain, 12 April 2002, para Decision on Annu 2003, para 425; A 2006, paras 101–4 Decision on Annu 453; Duke Energy v 13 March 2009, p Summit v Hungary Award, 12 January 2007

371 Benefensa c Award, 6 January 16 September 2000, del Aconquija, SA Plama v Bulgaria, 2009, para 151–2 Turkey, Award, 17

372 LETCO v l